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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, renewed interest has been shown in rural devel­
opment. Regional, state, and local organizations were formed to 
undertake the measures necessary to raise areal incomes, reduce the 
rural to urban migration, and augment the amenities offered by rural 
areas. The inducement of industry into rural communities has been 
viewed as one means of achieving the above goals. The methods employed 
to attract such industry have varied from simply expounding the vir­
tues of a nonmetropolitan location to providing complementary site, 
facility, and utilities. The results of the above efforts have been 
favorable. The rate of 1959-1969 manufacturing employment growth for 
nonmetropolitan counties had exceeded that of all SMSA subareas except 
the communities on the urban fringe (Table I-l). 
The rates for manufacturing employment growth somewhat exaggerate 
the progress small towns have experienced in attracting new industry 
because the base from which they started was very small. Many rural 
communities have not participated in, or are not satisfied with, the 
degree of industrialization that has occurred. Competition among 
cities for additional manufacturers remains intense, and each new 
addition to the community is eagerly reportsd by industrial promotion 
boards. 
Plant closings, which often nullify some of the gains realized 
through new acquisitions, are not so eagerly brought to the public's 
attention. Yet the employment loss resulting from these closures is 
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Table I-l. Manufacturing employment: rural and other metro-nonmetro 
counties. United States, 1959-1969.^ 
Annual percentage 
Class and subclass increase, 1959-1969 
All manufacturing 2.5 
Nonmetro 4.0 
Urban complex 3.3 
Rural-partly urban 4.6 
Small city 4.3 
Small town 4.6 
Entirely rural 5.8 
Metro 2.1 
Single county 3.0 
Multicounty 1.8 
Core 1.3 
Ring 3.7 
Transition 3.6 
Fringe 5.4 
Small city 5.2 
Small town 8.1 
^Source; [49, p. lO]. 
significant. In non-SMSA Iowa alone, an average of over 4,000 jobs 
were eliminated during each of the last eleven years because of plant 
failures or outmigration. Despite the magnitude and consequences of 
this phenomena, industrial outmigration has been studied relatively 
little by rural development organizations or regional economists. 
Too frequently plant closings have been dismissed as simply a random 
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happening over which the community has no control. However, these 
closings are not as random as casual observation would lead one to 
believe. Manufacturers are not homogeneous; they differ in the types 
of goods produced, plant size, resources required, and ownership 
characteristics (branch plants versus independent concerns). These 
factors can affect the locational stability of firms just as dispari­
ties in age, sex, race, and education affect the outmigration rates 
of workers. 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate both theoretically 
and empirically why and how specific plant characteristics (plant 
location with respect to the markets, ownership characteristics, and 
ownership changes resulting from mergers) can alter the outmigration 
rates of a community's manufacturers. In the following chapters it 
shall be shown that: (1) firms located on the periphery of the market 
area, and recently merged concerns are not locationally stable; and 
(2) the locational instability of branch plants exceeds that of unit 
concerns even though the local firm exhibited much higher probability 
.for failure. As a result of these inherent instabilities, communities 
with a heavy concentration of branch plants, or those areas located at 
relatively great distances from industrial and population centers, can 
expect to experience greater difficulty in maintaining or Increasing 
their industrial base. 
Trie characteristics of a region's industry will also alter the 
susceptibility of that area to fluctuations in the business cycle. 
Previous studies have found that the regional industrial mix between 
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durable versus nondurable goods, and high growth versus slow growth 
industries, will affect a region's cyclical pattern. However, accord­
ing to Borts, "...the difference in severity of state cycles are wider 
than would be expected on the basis of industrial composition alone" 
[4, p. 152]. This unexplained difference could result from the same 
plant characteristics that reduced locational stability, i.e., the 
ownership mix of a state's industry and the location of the state with 
respect to national and regional markets. In rural Iowa, branch plants 
have exhibited a greater propensity than unit firms for opening during 
prosperity and closing during a recession. Such a pattern of migra­
tion, which becomes more pronounced for isolated regions, contributes 
a procyclical factor to the region's economy. 
The findings underlying the above conclusions are presented in 
the following chapters. First, a theoretical analysis of the impact 
of demand changes on branch and unit plant migrations is provided. 
Secondly, the data and statistical procedures adapted to empirically 
test for locational instability differences are presented. Finally, 
interpretations of the statistical findings are suggested. 
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II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
A. Branch Plants Versus Unit Plants 
1. Introduction 
In the following section it shall be demonstrated, with the aid 
of certain restrictive assumptions, that situations may occur where a 
branch plant will cease production at a location while a unit firm 
will continue to operate. Since this chapter is concerned with the 
locational stability of multi-plant versus single plant firms, the 
theoretical market structure is restricted to monopolistic competition, 
oligopoly, and monopoly. A market consisting of primarily monopolis-
tically competitive firms would be the most realistic assumption; 
however, the complicity of diagraming long run demand changes in such 
a market (due to the Chamberlinian concept of presenting industry and 
firm demand curves on the same axis) weakens its effectiveness as an 
explanatory model. Oligopoly would also closely approximate reality, 
but the behavior of firms operating within such a market structure is 
difficult to analyze due to the interdependencies of firms' actions. 
Therefore, in order to most easily demonstrate the impact of market 
demand alterations on plant closings, the highly simplified assumption 
of monopolistic firms is adopted. The monopolistic market structure 
will more closely approximate reality if transportation costs are 
sufficient Co delineate market areas and reduce competition within 
these regions (as in a Christallerian Central Place System). In sum­
mary, the firms in the following models shall face a less than 
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perfectly elastic demand for their product. Of the market structures 
adhering to this criteria, monopoly is the easiest to analyze. 
It shall also be assumed that the average cost of producing a 
given output at a select site will not differ between branch and unit 
plants, i.e., the long run average cost curves for a branch plant at 
site A will be similar to that of a unit operation producing the same 
good at the same location. This may appear to be a grossly unrealistic 
assumption since many economies are often associated with multi-plant 
operations. The more frequently mentioned economies are (1) savings 
on management services, (2) centralized research and development, (3) 
massed reserves, (4) pecuniary economies, (5) transportation costs, 
and (6) marketing, advertising, and image benefits. However, Bain 
concludes after his in-depth analysis of 20 manufacturing industries 
that 
The economies of large multi-plant firms are left in doubt 
by this investigation. In half the cases in which definite 
estimates were received, such economies were felt to be 
negligible or absent, whereas in most of the remainder of 
cases they seemed slight or small. Perhaps the frequently 
expressed suspicion that such economies generally are un­
important after all is supported... [3, p. 38]. 
Therefore, in the following models all firms producing good X at site 
A will have similar cost curves, regardless of their ownership charac­
teristics. 
The first sections of this chapter will compare the locational 
stability of branch plants versus unit plants. Part C demonstrates 
why plant closings may closely follow the merger of a local firm with 
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an "outside" concern. Throughout this chapter a highly simplified 
model will first be presented, and subsequently select assumptions 
will be deleted to make the model conform more closely with reality. 
At this point it should be emphasized that the following theory does 
not attempt to prove that branches and acquired firms are always less 
locationally stable than local-homeowned concerns; only that realistic 
conditions frequently occur making them so. 
2. Theoretical models 
Case I. No Transportation Costs, Firms are Profit Maximizers. 
Assume: 
(1) The market demand curve for good X is linear. 
(2) The plants experience both economies and diseconomies of 
scale, i.e., face a U-shaped long run average cost curve. 
(3) There are no transportation costs for either inputs or out­
puts. 
(4) Both the multi-plant and unit concerns behave as profit 
maximizing monopolists. 
(5) The market demand for good X is sufficient to encourage the 
evolution of either one firm with two branches of optimal 
size (minimum long run average costs) or two individually 
owned plants of such size. 
(6) The plants are located such that the market is equally 
divided between the two. 
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(7) The firms producing good X are members of a constant cost 
industry. 
(8) Tlie individually owned firms do not collude. 
Given the above assumptions, the multi-plant monopolist faces the 
market demand curve. The two branch plants (or each of the unit firms) 
will experience exactly one-half of the market demand at each price, 
and therefore, is their respective demand curve (Figure II-l). 
Initially the profit realized by each unit or branch plant is the same 
Dg = market demand 
= unit firm or branch 
plant demand 
MRj^ = unit firm or branch 
plant marginal revenue 
Figure II-l. Market, branch, and unit plant demand and marginal 
revenue curves 
(area ABC in Figure ÎI-2), and the multiplant monopolist reaps a 
profit of exactly twice this amount. Now assume the demand for good 
X falls exactly in half, and producers of this item consider this a 
permanent change. now represents the total market demand, MRj^ is 
Price 
Quantity 
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the demand facing each branch or unit plant, and MR2 is the new plant 
marginal revenue curve. Under the depressed demand situation, the 
locally owned firms will continue to operate because an economic profit 
is still obtainable. Each concern will operate at level and realize 
a net return of AEq^O - FGq^O. The multi-plant monopolist has two 
options; (1) operate the two branches at level q^, or (2) close one 
branch and increase production the other to q^, i.e., allow one plant 
to face the new market demand and marginal revenue curves (D^ and MR^). 
From Figure 11-2 it is evident that profit will be maximized by elim­
inating production at one plant and allowing the other to satisfy the 
entire market demand.^ Therefore, in Case I the multi-plant monopolist 
is induced by scale economies to close one of the branches. Both unit 
concerns will continue to operate, though at a much reduced level. 
If the market demand is great enough to support many plants of 
optimal size, even a small reduction in sales may precipitate a closing 
of branches. For example. Bain [3] estimates that the optimal multi-
plant firm in the shoe industry includes four or five plants each 
providing approximately .5 percent of the national industry capacity 
(Table II-l). Therefore, if the industry consisted of 40 firms each 
with five plants, a decline in the demand for shoes by 20 percent 
could encourage every multi-plant firm to eliminate one of their 
branches. 
^Profit for each branch after the change in demand is AFD minus DGE. 
Twice this amount is less than ABC. 
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p 
,LMC plant 
LAC plant 
Figure II-2. Production changes in Case I 
Case II. No Transportation Costs, Firms are Revenue Maximizers. 
All the assumptions of Case I will be maintained except for #4. 
Since revenue has replaced profit as the decision variable; two sddi= 
tional assumptions are required. These are: 
(4a)' The multi-plant monopolist or the unit firms will alter 
their output, plant size, and the number of plants so as 
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Table II-l. Estimated absolute capital requirements for plants of 
estimated most efficient scale, circa 1951, for 20 in­
dustries^ 
Industry 
Percentage of 
national industry 
capacity provided 
by one efficient 
plant 
Total capital 
required for 
one efficient 
plant^ 
(expressed in 
millions of 
dollars) 
Category 1: 
Flour milling 
Shoes 
Canned fruits and vegetables 
Cement 
Distilled liquor 
Petroleum refining 
Meat packing (fresh) 
Meat packing (diversified) 
Tires and tubes 
Category 2: 
Steel 
Metal containers 
Rayon 
Soap 
Farm machines ex tractors 
Cigaretts 
Category 3: 
Gypsum products 
Automobiles 
Foundtain pens 
Copper 
Tractors 
Typewriters 
1/10 to 1/2 
1/7 to 1/2 
1/4 to 1/2 
4/5 to 1 
1 1/4 to 1 3/4 
1 3/4 
1/50 to 1/5 
2 to 2 1/2 
3 
1/2  
3 
1 to 2 
1/2 to 
4 to 6 
4 to 6 
4 to 6 
5 to 6 
2 1/2 to 
5 to 10 
5 to 10 
10 
10 to 15 
10 to 30 
.7 to 3.5 
.5 to 2.0 
2.5 to 3.0 
10.0 to 25.0 
193.0 
225.0 to 250.0 
very small 
10.0 to 20.0 
25.0 to 30.0 
265.0 to 665.0 
5.0 to 20.0 
50.0 to 135.0 
13.0 to 20.0 
no estimate 
125.0 to 150.0 
5.0 to 6.0 
150.0 to 500.0 
6.0 
no estimate 
125.0 
no estimate 
^Source: [3, p. 30]. 
^These estimates generally exclude anticipated "shakedown losses" of 
new entrants, which in some cases may be large and prolonged. 
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to maximize revenue subject to a minimum target profit 
level. 
(4b)' The level of market demand is such that the profit con­
straint is not initially binding, i.e., the firms may-
maximize revenue and simultaneously exceed the target 
profit. 
The locational stability of branches versus unit plants in Case 
II is more easily analyzed if the multi-plant monopolist's long run 
average cost curve is constructed. The unit firm must adopt larger 
and larger plant sizes if it attempts to increase its production, i.e., 
it is restricted to movement along its long run average cost curve. 
However, the multi-plant concern has the option of constructing new 
facilities if the demand is sufficient to support more than one plant. 
In the hypothetical situation depicted by Figure II-3, the multi-plant 
firm will desire two plants once the anticipated output level exceeds 
Quantity 
Figure II-3. Multi-plant monopolist's LAC 
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qj^, and shall construct three plants of optimal size if demand warrants 
the production of Sqg units of good X. The long run average cost curve 
facing the multi-plant monopolist is the envelope of the individual 
branches' cost curves; and as the number of plants approaches infinity, 
the long run average cost curve of the constant cost multi-plant 
monopolist approaches a horizontal line. 
In Figure II-4, the original market demand (DQ) is sufficient to 
(1) encourage the revenue maximizing multi-plant firm to construct two 
branches of optimal size (Qq)» or (2) support two locally owned con­
cerns of same size. Now if demand should fall by one-half, MRQ will 
represent the new market demand. MR^ and MR2 are respectively the 
demand and marginal revenue of each branch/unit firm in the depressed 
market. After the fall in demand, branch or unit plants will maximize 
revenue at qg/Z and realize a profit of ABCD. The unit concerns ex­
perience a positive economic profit, and therefore, will continue to 
operate. The multi-plant monopolist has the option of operating one 
plant at qg or two at level q^/Z. Both options provide the multi-
plant firm with the same total revenue, but a consolidation of pro­
duction into one facility would increase profits. Whether the multi-
plant company elects to maintain production at two branches or service 
the market from only one plant will depend on the importance of prof­
its relative to locational inertia, proximity to customers, etc.. 
However, if the drop in sales is sufficient to reduce profits 
below the target level, the multi-plant monopolist will no longer be­
have as a revenue maximizer. To maintain the prescribed profit level. 
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Quantity 
where DQ = original market demand 
MRQ = original market marginal revenue 
= original demand facing each branch 
= original demand facing each unit firm 
MR., = original marginal revenue facing each branch or unit 
firm 
= the demand faced by each branch or unit firm after the 
decline in demand 
MRg = the marginal revenue of each branch or unit firm after 
the decline in demand 
Figure II-4. Production changes in Case II 
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production will be consolidated into fewer plants to allow more 
efficient utilization of scale economies. In conclusion, unless the 
profit constraint is binding, the behavior of the revenue maximizing 
multi-plant firm will depend on secondary considerations and may not 
differ from that of the individually owned plants. 
Case III. No Transportation Costs, Firms are Utility Maximizers. 
Again assume all the assumptions of Case I are maintained except 
#4. Now the output of the firms is adjusted in an attempt to maximize 
to utility of the owners (managers) where utility is some function of 
sales and profit. 
U = f(lT,Z) 
where 
IT = profit 
L = sales 
Assume the initial market situation is identical to that de­
picted in Case I (Figure II-5). Both branches or unit plants are 
producing between and qg units of X and realizing a positive profit 
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less than ABC. After a reduction in demand by one-half, both locally 
owned concerns will decrease production, but not below The multi-
plant firm is again given the option of operating two branches at an 
output above q^^ (but less than qg) or only one plant at a level be­
tween q^ and qg. Since 2qj is greater than q^, Zq^ exceeds q2, and 
the profit for one plant will exceed that of two branches, the multi-
plant firm is confronted by a tradeoff. Which option is selected will 
depend on the relative utility of sales versus profit. 
In conclusion, when transportation costs are ignored, a decrease 
in demand may encourage branches to close while unit plants remain 
open regardless of the decision variables employed by the owners. How­
ever, branches operated by managers desiring to maximize profits are 
more susceptible to closings than those of revenue or utility maximiz­
ing owners. 
Case IV. Transportation Costs Exist, Firms are Profit Maximizers. 
The introduction of transportation costs into the analysis of 
locational stability increases greatly the complicity of the problem. 
In order to maintain a manageable model of firm behavior. Case I (the 
profit maximizing firms) will be adopted with the following alterations 
made in assumption #3. 
It will now be assumed that; 
(3a) Customers are homogenous and uniformly distributed, at a 
2 density of T sales per linear mile (i sales per square 
mile), throughout the market area. 
17 
P 
A 
LMC 
LAC 
B 
MR, 
where Dj^ = one-half of the original total market demand 
= original demand confronting each of the two branch or unit 
plants 
= demand facing the plant if only one plant is utilized in 
supplying the depressed market 
MRj^ = original MR confronting each of the two branch or unit 
plants 
= the demand curve facing each of the two branch or unit 
plants after demand has fallen by one-half, i.e., from 
to Dg. 
= MR facing the plant if only one plant is utilized in sup­
plying the depressed market. 
MRg = MR curve facing each of the two branch or unit plants if 
two plants are utilized in supplying the depressed market. 
Figure II-5. Production changes in Case III 
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(3b) Market areas for each branch or unit plant are circular 
with a radius of d miles. 
(3c) Terminal costs are constant and equal to t dollars per unit. 
(3d) Transportation costs consist solely of transporting the 
final product to the consumers. No costs are associated 
with acquiring inputs, and the firm pays the transit costs. 
(3e) The total cost of shipping each unit will increase with 
distance, but at a decreasing rate (Figure II-6). 
Let 
c = total transportation cost per unit of X 
c = f(d) 
c = + t 
where 
0 < a < I . 
Therefore, the average cost of transporting each unit will decline at 
an increasing rate with respect to distance. 
Transportation 
cost per unit 
Distance (d) 
Figure II-6. Transit costs as a function of distance 
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Finally, assumption #9 presents the relationship between the 
density of sales, range of the product, and the demand for good X. 
(9) Assume the market demand facing the multi-plant firm is as 
illustrated below (Figure II-7). Also assume that at each 
price P^, customers are distributed at a density of Tp^ per 
linear mile in rings at distance d^^ (where d^ = dg to d*) 
around the plant. To sell the quantity stipulated by the 
aforementioned demand curve at each price, the firm must ship 
goods to the limit of its market area, i.e., d miles. If 
the price of X should fall to the density of sales per 
ring will increase so that at the lower price (P^ < Pj^) more 
sales could be conducted within a closer proximity of the 
plant. However, all consumers willing to pay P^, regardless 
of their distance from the plant, must be served in order to 
market the q^ units of X. So as the price of X falls, T will 
P 
P i 
XD, 
Figure II-7. Multi-plant monopolist demand curve 
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increasÊ, but the same proportion of goods must be shipped 
to each ring in order to sell the quantity designated by the 
market demand curve. 
Given the above assumptions, transportation costs can be expressed 
as a function of quantity and then incorporated into the long run 
average cost curve of the firms. After this is accomplished, the im­
pact of changes in demand on transportation costs, total costs, and 
the behavior of multi-plant versus independent concerns will be ana­
lyzed. 
1) Derivation of transit costs: 
Let 
TT ^ = Total cost of transporting good X to all the customers 
^ within d* miles of the plant 
* 
d 
TT * = ^ (quantity of X shipped to customers d. miles from 
d i=0 ^ 
the plant) • (Cost of transporting one unit of X d^ miles.) 
Under assumptions (3a) and (3b), the number of customers in a 
ring of width miles, and at a distance d^ miles from the plant, 
equals (2Trd^T)Aia^. Therefore, total transit costs may be formulated 
as: 
2 a 
TT * = % (27rd.T )(dT + t)Ay . (1) 
d i=0 
So, in the limit 
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d 
TT * = / 2TrdT (d + t)dd 
d 0 
= + Cl') 
"k 
where d = the maximum distance from the plant for which goods are 
sold. 
Equation (1') provides the total transit cost required to trans­
port goods throughout the market area. To ascertain the average 
transportation cost with respect to quantity, TT * is divided by 
d 
2 2 quantity, where q = ÏÏT d . 
(2 )  
TrT^(d*)^ 
K + t . 
In this model, average transit costs in terms of quantity are only a 
* 
function of the range (d ) of the market area. This should be ex­
pected because as we move down along the firm's demand curve, the in­
crease in quantity sold results solely from a change in the value of 
T. At a lower price and higher quantity, both TT * and q will Increase 
2 2 ^ by the same proportion (Xj^ = TQ) ; therefore, average costs will not 
change (Figure II-8). 
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AT 
d* 
Quantity 
Figure II-8. Average transportation costs expressed as a function of 
quantity 
The only factor that could alter the average transit costs is the 
range of that plant's goods. For example, if the market was shared by 
two plants, each with a range of d*/2, then the average transportation 
cost with respect to quantity would be determined as follows: 
r**/: 2 a TT . = / 27rdT^(d + t)dd 
d /2 0 
"q + t - (2) 
* ^ * ot Since (d /2) < (d ) , then the average cost of distributing the 
product from two plants is less than that of having one plant meet the 
entire market demand. 
2) The impact of transit costs on locatloual stability: 
As should be expected, the effect of a change in demand on the 
locational stability of multi-plant versus unit plant concerns is less 
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predictable once transit costs are introduced. If transportation 
expenses are relatively unimportant, the impact of a decline in sales 
on the closings of branch plants should not differ from that of Case 
I. However, industries which experience high transport costs will be 
less likely to sacrifice locational proximity for the production ef­
ficiencies to be gained by consolidating in fewer plants. Figure II-9 
provides the example of a firm in which transportation costs represent 
a large portion of total costs. As in the previous cases, demand is 
originally sufficient to warrant the use of two branch plants. Now if 
sales again fall by 50 percent, the demand and marginal revenue curves 
will shift as before. The multi-plant monopolist must now select be­
tween operating one plant at level q2 or both facilities at If 
the firm elects to use only one plant to service the entire market 
area, average transportation costs will Increase from 2[ ^  ^  ^  J + t 
(d*)^ 
to 2[^ ^  2^ + t, and the long run average cost curve will shift upward 
by the amount of the increase in average transit costs, i.e., from 
LAC^ to LACj^. The profit realized by maintaining production at both 
branches, 2(ABCD), exceeds the net return of the consolidated plants, 
EFGH. In the above case, the multiplant firm is no less locationally 
stable than the independent concerns. However, if a is small relative 
to 1; or if terminal costs are subject to economies of scale, transit 
costs may not be sufficient to warrant two plants. 
A further inducement to maintain production at all branches is 
the phenomena that a and t may increase relative to other prices 
during a cyclical downturn. Hoover notes that during depression 
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Figure II-9. Production changes in Case IV 
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periods, the importance of procurement and distribution costs is en­
hanced because transportation rates are cyclically less flexible. He 
concludes that, "It is significant that these depression effects 
predominantly favor a decentralization of both employment and popula­
tion" [12, p. 147]. 
3. Additional factors and conclusion 
The previous discussion has left the problem of the locational 
stability of branches versus local plants in considerable doubt. The 
analysis is further complicated if the assumption of identical long 
run average cost curves is eliminated. In Bain's [3] study on the 
economies of multi-plant operations, he discovered some cases in which 
multi-plant economies equaled two to five percent of total costs. 
These savings may just be enough to differentiate between branch plant 
realizing an economic profit and a unit firm not making a "fair" re­
turn. Given these economies, branch plants may more easily be able to 
survive a cyclical or secular downturn in demand. So the oft noted 
ability of multi-plant firms to attract more capable managers, main­
tain easier access to the financial markets, and benefit from the afore­
mentioned scale economies implies that the survival rate of multi-plant 
firms should exceed that of independent operations. The threat of a 
branch moving out of a community may exceed that of a unit plant, but 
the possibility of the parent company failing is often viewed as less 
likely than the closing of a local concern. However, there also exist 
two factors which would increase the propensity of branch closures 
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relative to independent firms. First, branches could achieve a savings 
in overhead costs by consolidating production when sales decline. 
North notes that multi-plant firms often react to the stresses 
of low growth rates and profitability levels by "planned contraction 
of capacity and a reduction of overheads, thereby enabling more inten­
sive use of capital assets" [33, p. 230]. This is consistent with the 
previous theoretical cases. Secondly, homegrown-locally owned firms 
are more likely to experience Ideational inertia than plants whose 
owners reside outside the community. Mueller, Wilken, and Wood state 
that 
In the choice between staying or migrating elsewhere inertia 
plays a major role. Attitudes are important because they 
affect sensitivity to changes in the economic environment. 
If satisfaction prevails, relocation is not likely to come 
under consideration, unfavorable costs or market changes 
will tend to be ignored, unless they are of considerable 
magnitude [31, p. 20]. 
The owner's satisfaction with a location will be enhanced if he 
maintains personal ties with the community. A study by the University 
of Michigan [3l] comparing the relative importance of different vari­
ables in selecting a location, indicates that the impact of personal 
factors on the locational decision was much more pronounced in unit 
concerns than multi-plant firms (Table II-2). Since personal factors 
weighed heavily on the unit firm's decision to initially locate in an 
area, it should not be presuraptious to assume that they would affect 
a decision to relocate or not-. In fact; North's analysis of industrial 
migration in England found that. 
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Table II-2. Explanations given for location of plant by number of 
plants operated by firm® 
Number of plants operated by firm 
Main reasons for locating one 2-4 5 or more 
plant at particular site plant plants plants 
% of employment represented 
Personal reasons; chance 55 32 20 
Opportunity - found good site, etc. 27 16 14 
Proximity to customers 16 15 14 
Proximity to auto industry 7 14 12 
Labor advantages 4 9 7 
Proximity to materials 7 6 15 
Local concessions and inducements 2 4 7 
Better tax situation 4 6 2 
Area already established as a 
center for the industry 12 4 
^Source: [31, p. 16]. 
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...very small, privately-owned firms, usually concerned 
with trade conversion, confined their search to a radius 
of no more than ten miles about the present factory. 
Dominating the search was the constraint of retaining 
most of the existing workers since it often took a small 
firm several years to build up a loyal labour force: 
the loss of key workers could be disasterous to the 
firms development. The avoidance of moving executives' 
homes and familiarity with the local business environ­
ment were added inducements for a short distance trans­
fer [33, p. 233]. 
So ties to the community and a lack of information about other areas 
and opportunities may discourage the homegrown concern from seeking a 
more profitable location. This inertia is largely responsible for 
Hoover's observation that "branch plants are more responsive to change 
in locational advantage than independent plants under otherwise similar 
circumstances" [12, p. 151]. 
In conclusion, while the probability of a multi-plant firm failing 
is less than that of a independent concern, three principal factors 
encourage greater locational mobility for branch plants versus home­
grown firms during periods of depressed demand. These are: 
(1) The ability of multi-plant firms to increase production 
efficiencies by consolidating production into fewer plants. 
(2) The ability of multi-plant concerns to reduce overhead costs 
by closing branches and transferring production elsewhere. 
(3) The relative lack of locational inertia. 
The primary impetus for maintaining production at all facilities 
would be to minimize transportation costs. Therefore, whether branches 
are less locationally stable than independent firms will depend on the 
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relative importance of efficiency (determined by the shape of the long 
run average cost curve), overhead costs, and inertia versus transpor­
tation costs and the differential survival rate. 
Note that the same factors that precipitated branch closings 
will have the opposite effect during a boom period. As sales increase 
and existing plants are forced to produce at levels beyond the optimal 
output, the multi-plant firm will open additional branches in order to 
maintain efficient production and minimize transportation costs. A 
community that attracts branches, due to certain locational advantages 
or its position in the urban hierarchy, may experience an influx of 
new industry during prosperity and an exodus in a depression. Thus, 
if branch plants are in fact less locationally stable than independent 
firms, the cyclical sensitivity of the region will be affected by the 
ownership characteristics of its industry. 
B. The Locational Bias of Plant Openings and Closings 
The previous theoretical models provided situations in which the 
multiplant monopolist elected to close some plants and transfer 
production to the remaining facilities. However, because the produc­
tion and transportation costs of all branches were assumed similar, 
the monopolist was indifferent as to which plants to close. In reali­
ty, production and transit costs will vary among the different loca­
tions, and all of the multi-plant corporation's branches are not 
equally susceptible to closings. Those facilities whose operations 
are considered the least efficient (from a production or location 
30 
standpoint) will be terminated in order to maintain efficiency in the 
remaining plants. According to Krumme and Hayter, 
Often the opportunity (recession) is used to close branch 
plants which are marginal, possibly, however, only from 
an intra-corporate point of view.... In industries with 
comparatively mobile and short-lived capital goods (such 
as the clothing industry), the only function of such mar­
ginal plants may have been to accommodate temporary peak 
production during a preceding economic boom or a period 
of overlapping product cycle stages [25, p. 331]. 
These "marginal" plants are not distributed in a locationally unbiased 
manner. A study of plant closures in Great Britain found that, 
In all cases it was the most geographically peripheral 
factory relative to the market distribution that had these 
problems (falling profits, poor access to market areas, 
and excess production capacity during a recession) and 
was closed [33, p. 241]. 
Therefore, regions whose manufacturers must endure higher transit 
costs, because of greater distances from the population and industrial 
centers, may be the first to lose their branch plants during a reces­
sion. Such communities may hâve beeû able to originally attract 
branches to their high transport cost location because of labor avail­
ability. However, during slow growth periods other locations will 
also have surplus labor; and as a result, their compensating advantage 
is eliminated. 
The peripheral regions that were the first to experience branch 
closing will be attractive locations once prosperity returns. Re­
sources freed by the previous recession (labor, land, and factories) 
will induce firms back into the area as such factors of production 
become less available in regions not as severely affected by plant 
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closings. The multi-plant firm is now willing to incurs the higher 
transit costs of these locations because of their relative abundance 
of resources. 
According to Lever, evidence of the above cyclical pattern is 
available. His studies have found that 
...the five years of peak plant establishment are each pre­
ceded by peaks in the unemployment rate and it seems possible 
that the resources which are used or underused in depressed 
economic condition form an important incentive to new industry 
once the process of upswing begins [27, p. 219]. 
In conclusion, locations which have shown the greatest propensities 
for plant closings during a recession should also experience the largest 
relative number of plant openings during prosperity. The procyclical 
nature of these regions will be quite pronounced. 
C. Mergers and Industry Locational Stability 
The industrial base of a community may also be affected if one 
of its firms is acquired by au 'outside' concern. Ests-ll and Buchanan 
noted that, 
Direct spatial consequences often follow from expansion 
by takeover or merger as the enlarged company sets out to 
'rationalize' its affairs. This process often involves 
the closing of plants in some centers and regrouping ac­
tivities in some preferred location [8, p. 114]. 
So an ownership change through merger may be detrimental to the loca­
tional stability of that particular firm. ^ 
This section will provide an explanation as to why plant closings 
may closely follow acquisitions. First, a review of the principal 
^Note that mergers shall always refer to local companies being acquired 
by 'outside' concerns. 
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motives for merger will be presented. Secondly, three of the motives 
encouraging horizontal acquisitions shall be analyzed to demonstrate 
their consistency with subsequent closures. Finally, suppositions as 
to the negative impact of vertical and circular mergers on location 
stability and the implications of all mergers on rural development 
shall be discussed. 
1. Motives for merger 
A merger is a transaction in the market for corporate control. 
There exists both a buyer and a seller, and the transaction will occur 
when the benefits to each party exceed the costs and inertia which may 
exist. Both parties are influenced by a separate set of expectations 
which they believe a merger will fulfill. However, it is the acquiring 
firm that decides whether plants shall be relocated or closed; there­
fore, it is their desires and expectations that are of primary interest 
to this study. The following list provides a S'lmmary of the buyer's 
possible motives [39, 40]. 
(1) The expectation of reduced competition and increased monoply 
power for the acquiring firm. 
(2) A desire to acquire new capacity at bargain prices. 
(3) A desire to expand production without depressing prices. 
(4) To 'rationalize' the existing production operations of the 
acquiring firm. 
(5) A desire to secure production and/or physical distribution 
scale economies. 
33 
(6) A desire to achieve sufficient size to have efficient access 
to capital markets or inexpensive advertising. 
(7) A desire to diversity to reduce the risks of business or to 
move from declining to expanding fields. 
(8) A desire to overcome critical lacks in one's own company by 
acquiring the necessary complementary resources, patents, or 
factors of production. 
(9) A desire of managers to control an evergrowing set of sub­
ordinates (empire building motive). 
(10) A desire of managers to create an image of themselves as 
aggressive managers who recognize a good thing when they see 
it. 
(11) A desire to utilize tax loopholes not available without 
merging. 
(12) A desire to reap the promotional or speculative gains attend­
ant upon new securities, or changed price earnings ratios. 
A firm influenced by motives 1, 2, 3, or 4 will be primarily in­
terested in a horizontal merger. Circular and vertical mergers usually 
result from expectation 7 and 8, respectively. The remaining motives 
(5, 6, 9, 10, 11, and 12) may encourage acquisitions of all forms; 
i.e., either horizontal, vertical, or circular. Of course, all 12 of 
the aforementioned reasons for merging will not inherently result in 
subsequent plant closures. However, as shall be demonstrated below, 
horizontal mergers initiated under motives 3, 4, and 5, in conjunction 
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with increased monopoly power, could easily lead to closings of the 
acquired firm's plants. 
2. Horizontal mergers^ 
As the demand for an industry's product declines, firms are con­
fronted with excess plant capacity in the short run or a less than 
optimal plant size during the long run. It was previously noted that 
multi-plant firms with low distribution costs would consolidate pro­
duction in such a situation. An alternative response to these detri­
mental conditions may take the form of mergers and acquisitions. 
Estall and Buchanan hypothesized that during a recession, "the dangers 
of overcapacity in an industry can be avoided by 'phasing out' certain 
production plants after acquisition, and the remaining plant and equip­
ment can be used more intensively..." [8, p. 113]. In other words, 
mergers enhance the ability of acquiring firms to shut down redundant 
plants in an industry plagued by excess capacity. However, some de­
gree of imperfect competition must exist prior to or result from the 
merger, otherwise plant closings may have a detrimental effect on the 
firm's profitability. This may be easily demonstrated by analyzing 
the results of a merger in the two extreme market situations (perfect 
competition and duopoly). 
^To show that a recently acquired firm is less locationally stable 
than a similar locally owned concern, it will again be demonstrated 
that under certain assumptions the former will be closed while 
the latter continues to operate. 
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Case I. Horizontal Merger of Two Single Plant Competitors. 
Assumptions: 
(1) All firms are profit maximizing competitors. 
(2) All firms have identical cost curves. 
(3) The relevant time period is the short-run. 
(4) Market supply and demand conditions are such that the product 
price covers average variable costs but not average total 
costs. 
Given the above assumptions, each firm will minimize losses by 
producing output at price PQ (Figure 11-10). Now if one firm merges 
with more than one of its competitors, and subsequently closes the ac­
quired firms' plants, market supply will decrease to Sj and the remain­
ing firms' losses will be reduced. However, all firms have benefited 
IVC 
/ -
Typical Firm Market 
Figure 11-10. Mergers and perfect competition 
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equally from the merger with only the acquiring firm bearing the costs. 
A company in the above situation would not initiate a merger but in­
stead hope that it would be able to sustain losses for a greater length 
of time than its competitors. 
Case II. Horizontal Merger of Single Plant Duopolists. 
Assumptions ; 
(1) The duopolists are profit maximizers and share the market 
equally. 
(2) The two firms have identical cost curves. 
(3) Transportation costs are insignificant. 
(4) The relevant time period is again the short run. 
(5) The single plant duopolists do not collude. 
(6) Market demand conditions are such that the duopolists are 
plagued by excess plant capacity and short-run loses. 
Figure 11-11 graphically depicts a situation for which the above 
assumptions hold. In this example, SAC, SVC, and SMC represent the 
short-run average total, average variable, and marginal cost curves 
of the two plants and each firm faces demand and marginal revenue 
curves and MRp respectively. Initially, each duopolist is minimiz­
ing loses by producing qg units of X. However, if a merger and subse­
quent closure occurs, the remaining facility will face the entire 
market demand (Dg), increase production from qg to q^, and realize a 
positive profit. Should the discounted value of current and future 
profits be sufficient to cover the acquisitions costs, a merger will 
be consummated. 
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Figure II-II. Mergers and duopoly 
Case III. Horizontal Mergers and Scale Economies. 
A horizontal merger initiated by the desire to secure production 
scale economies may also lead to plant closures. One firm may acquire 
another to insure that their market will support a new facility of 
optimal size. An increase in plant size and output without a 
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concomitant increase in demand would just result in a decrease in 
product prices. Therefore, the desire for more efficient production 
must be accompanied by the expectations of reduced competition and 
increased monopoly power. Scherer states that "...there simply does 
not appear to be much opportunity to realize plant scale economies 
through mergers, unless an interaction effect with monopoly exists" 
[39, p. 117]. 
To demonstrate the scale benefits from merger and subsequent 
closures, a model quite similar to that found in Case IV of the pre­
ceding section is adopted. Assume: 
(1) Two distinct noncolluding firms (A and B), each with two 
identical plants, are providing product Z to two circular 
market areas. 
(2) Each company has a plant at location I and II. 
(3) The market is divided equally among the four plants. 
(4) Each plant is operating at below the optimum scale, but 
transportation costs are sufficiently high to discourage 
consolidating into one plant per firm. 
(5) As in Case IV of Section B, the average cost of transporting 
a given quantity of Z varies only with the range of the 
market area, i.e., the radius of the market. 
(6) Firms are profit maximizers. 
Given the above simplifying assumptions, the following model 
shall demonstrate that the profit accruing to the producers of Z would 
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be increased by merging firms A and B and eliminating a plant at both 
locations I and II. Figure 11-12 depicts the initial market situation. 
Originally each plant is producing units of Z at a profit of ABCD. 
If A and B merge and construct two plants of optimal size, one at each 
location, the new plants will face the demand and marginal revenue 
curves D^/2 and D^/4, respectively.^ The merged company, A and B In­
corporated, will be producing q^ items in each plant and realizing a 
total profit of 2(EFGH). Since 2(EFGH) is greater than 4(ABCD), the 
advantages of merger, construction of larger scale plants, and closures 
exist in this model. 
In conclusion, the closures predicted by the previous cases are 
consistent with North's findings regarding the merger movement in Great 
Britain. His studies have shown that. 
Occasionally, the decision to take over a company was fol­
lowed by a decision to close one or more of its factories 
and move plant, machinery, management, and skilled labour 
to the parent company's plants. It was the size (market), 
profitability, and assets of the new company which were 
important, not its factory or location. Rationalization 
plans were drawn up to concentrate production activities 
at a restricted number of sites and so reduce expenditure 
on overheads, minimize management and administrative dup­
lication and produce a tightly, efficiently run company 
[33, p. 241]. 
3. Circular and vertical mergers 
Locational instability of the acquired firm is not inherent in 
any of the motives influencing vertical or conglomerate mergers. 
^Since average transit costs with respect to quantity are only a func­
tion of the radius of the plant's market area, and since the acquisi­
tion has not affected this, the cost curves shall remain unchanged. 
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Figure 11-12. Mergers and scale economies 
However, there exist two factors which may increase the propensity 
for plant relocation or closure of recently acquired firms over similar 
locally owned concerns. First, the ownership change resulting from the 
acquisition should reduce the locational inertia accruing from the 
previous owner's personal ties to the community. The new management 
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should be more responsive to locational advantages that have developed 
elsewhere. Secondly, managerial problems may prevent the merger from 
becoming a success.^ As the acquiring company increases in size, the 
ability of management to oversee and coordinate all aspects of the 
operation may decline. The increased remoteness of management and 
decision making may create problems in the more distant plants and 
lead to labor difficulties. These difficulties may in turn lead to 
dissatisfaction with the current location and encourage either reloca­
tion or closing of the facility. 
4. Mergers and regional development 
Even if the merger of a local company with an 'outside' concern 
has no impact of the locational stability of that firm, it may still 
be detrimental to the development of the region. A study by Brue on 
the local employment and payroll impacts of corporate mergers in 
Nebraska fôurid that, 
Rather than serving to increase employment and payroll 
growth, it would appear that corporate mergers may, in 
fact, adversely affect employment and payrolls in the 
localities of the acquired firms. This is, of course, 
a generalized conclusion. In many cases post-merger 
growth rates far exceeded pre-merger rates and the rates 
of comparable firms; in other instances, the opposite 
was true. On the average, and in the aggregate, however, 
the local employment and payroll impacts were adverse 
[5, p. 10]. 
This failure rate is not insignificant. A study noted by Scherer [39] 
found that one merger in every six ended in failure in the sense that 
the acquired firm failed to make a profit within three years, or ac­
quired products had to be changed radically, or the acquired company 
was subsequently sold. 
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Furthermore, the acquired company may abandon his local suppliers 
(banking, materials, legal services) in favor of those selected by the 
new management. These abandonments will generate additional adverse 
employment and payroll impacts throughout the community. 
Another detrimental effect of mergers is the decline in the qual­
ity and quantity of endogenous entreprenuerial and managerial talent. 
These talents will be attracted to those regions with the greatest 
possible opportunities, and as corporate headquarters move out of a 
region, so will this talent.^ The Scottish Council for Development 
and Industry has long appreciated the consequences of mergers on the 
location of entreprenuerial talent. They feared that, 
...the quantity and quality of management in Scotland 
was in danger of declining through business mergers 
and takeovers, which were removing decision-making 
powers (and thus the decision makers themselves) from 
the country. As management posts decline in this 
way so does the vigour and drive of the whole public 
life of the community run down [8, p. 106]. 
D. Conclusions 
The preceding theoretical models have provided this study with 
three general hypotheses. These are: 
(1) Unless transportation costs are high, the locational stability 
of unit plants will exceed that of branch plants. Further­
more, branches will exhibit a greater propensity for closing 
^lowa has experienced a fairly substantial net loss of corporate con­
trol in manufacturing. From 1955 to 1968, Iowa companies acquired 42 
out-of-state concerns; however, during the same period 110 Iowa firms 
were purchased by companies outside the state [5J. 
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during a recession and opening in prosperity than local con­
cerns. 
(2) Plant locational instability is not geographically unbiased. 
Those regions located at the periphery of the market area 
should realize relatively greater plant outmigration during 
a recession and inmigration during prosperity than areas more 
centrally located. 
(3) Recently acquired firms should be less locationally stable 
than plants where an ownership change has not occurred. This 
instability will be greatest among firms engaged in horizon­
tal, product extension, and market extension mergers. 
In the following chapter, the data and methods employed to test 
the above hypotheses are presented. Chapter IV provides a Summary of 
the results. 
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III. DATA SOURCES AND STATISTICAL METHODS 
A. Data Sources for the Plant Openings and Closings 
1. Plant openings 
To analyze the impact of demand fluctuations and mergers on the 
migration of rural manufacturers, a sample of inmigrating and outmi­
grating plants for non-SMSA Iowa was required and procurred.^ The 
names and characteristics (Iowa location, principal products, year pro­
duction was initiated, ownership characteristics, and headquarters) of 
all the inmigrating firms were acquired from annual Iowa Development 
Commission publications [13-19]. The Development Commission applied a 
two stage process to insure that the information obtained about the new 
firms was complete and accurate. First, the names and characteristics 
of the incoming plants were acquired from public reports (newspapers. 
Chamber of Commerce newsletters, etc.) and contacts with local organi­
zations or individuals (local development commissions or Chambers of 
Commerce, city clerks of incorporated communities, and county clerks 
for data pertaining to unincorporated towns). Secondly, the inmigrating 
company was contacted and requested to verify the information collected 
in step one. The Iowa Development Commission believes that they were 
1 
The term outmigrating is interpreted loosely to refer to plants that 
had either actually transferred production from one community to 
another or those that had ceased production altogether, Inmigration 
is also a slight misnomer. It refers to both the "birth" of a company 
and the movement of an already existing firm into the community. Since 
plant inmigrations and "births" or outmigrations and "deaths" affect 
community development in a similar fashion, the above definitions will 
be considered interchangeable. 
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quite diligent in their search for the names and characteristics of new 
industry. They estimate their reply rate to be near 98 percent. My 
own experience with the data leads me to conclude that it is quite ac­
curate, though in a very few cases firms that were listed as opening 
never evolved past the planning stage into actual production. 
The criteria used for selecting which plant openings to include 
in the survey differed in two ways from that applied to plant closures. 
(1) Information on inmigrants was selected for the period 1963-1975. 
The sample of outmigrating firms was collected from a shorter time 
horizon, 1965-1975. (2) Only firms employing twenty or more were con­
sidered for the outmigrating sample. No information pertaining to the 
projected employment of new firms was available, therefore, the list 
of plant openings contains firms of all sizes. It is unfortunate that 
the two samples are not more similar; however, since the procedures 
used to obtain data on closed plants relied heavily on the respondents' 
memories, these alterations (shorter time horizon and larger plants) 
were necessary to insure greater accuracy in their answers. Because 
of the above disparities, the reader must be careful when comparing and 
contrasting the openings and closings of Iowa firms. 
The data collected from the Iowa Development Commission on plant 
openings according to ownership characteristics (branch versus local) 
are presented below in Table III-l. Additional characteristics pertain­
ing to the new firms are provided in Tables III-6 and A-2 of the Ap­
pendix. 
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Table III-l. Annual branch and local plant openings in rural Iowa, 
1963-1975* 
Year 
Openings 
Branch Local Total 
1963 22 24 46 
1964 30 35 65 
1965 24 28 52 
1966 30 25 55 
1967 25 14 39 
1968 19 24 43 
1969 25 17 42 
1970 23 23 46 
1971 24 17 41 
1972 33 21 54 
1973 33 33 66 
1974 26 35 61 
1975 16 25 41 
Total 330 321 651 
^Sources: calculated from [13-19], 
2. Plant closures 
The sample of plant closures, and the data concerning each (Iowa 
location, date closed, peak employment, principal products, ownership 
characteristics, merger partner and date of merger [if any], and reason 
for closing), had to be generated. The following series of operations 
were required. First, the outmigrating firms were isolated from the 
survivors. This entailed comparing the listings in the 1965 through 
1975 Iowa Directory of Manufacturing [14-18] with the 1975-76 edition 
[19], and noting those companies whose names appeared in the earlier 
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directories but not in the latest publication. Next, these apparently 
"deceased" firms were classified according to communities and size. 
Finally, knowledgeable individuals in each community, and whenever 
possible, executives associated with the "potentially outmigrating" 
2 firm were contacted by telephone. These persons were requested to 
confirm or deny the closing or outmigration of particular plants in 
their community or with their company. In many cases, the plants pro­
vided by the "survival" method were too small to include, or they were 
still in operation but under a different name. If the operation had 
in fact ceased, the following information was solicited; 
(1) The year the company ceased production in their community. 
(2) The estimated peak employment of the plant. 
(3) The principal products produced by the company in the com­
munity. 
(4) The ownership characteristics of the concern; i.e., was the 
facility locally owned, not locally owned but an independent 
operation, a branch or subsidiary of another company. 
^The Iowa Directories of Manufacturing are bi-annual publications of 
the Iowa Development Commission. The information contained in each 
edition (company name, Iowa location, principal products, employment, 
plant manager or owner, and location of headquarters) is acquired 
through surveys with local development commissions and Chambers of 
Commerce, city or county clerks, and the manufacturers. Again, my 
experience with the data leads me to conclude that the Directories are 
quite accurate. However, a degree of underreporting was noticed dur­
ing my interviews with local Chambers of Commerce. 
2 
The most frequently contacted individuals in the communities were per­
sons of leadership in the local development commissions of Chambers of 
Commerce, Iowa State Extension personnel, or the mayors or bank presi­
dents of the smaller municipalities. 
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(5) If the plant was a branch or subsidiary, who was the parent 
company and where were their headquarters? 
(6) Had the plant, or parent company of the plant, been acquired 
by another individual or company during its life in the com­
munity? If so, when did this acquisition (merger) occur and 
who was the buyer? 
(7) The reasons production was halted or moved out of the com­
munity. 
(8) The names of any management personnel who had remained in the 
area after the local operation had ceased. 
If other sources of information (such as corporate executives, previous 
employees, or the original owners) were available, they were also con­
tacted and requested to answer the above questions. 
In total, 197 communities plus numerous companies and employees 
were contacted. The data obtained through these surveys (location of 
the closed plant, peak employment, principal products, headquarters, 
parent company [if any], date of and reason for closing, names of the 
merged firms and date of acquisition) are provided in Table A-1 of the 
Appendix. The ownership characteristics of the 128 outmigrating or 
closed plants are summarized below in Table III-2. 
With only rare exception, the individuals contacted were extremely 
cooperative and willing to provide the necessary information. Fre­
quently, the initial interviewees were able to provide additional 
sources and even closed firms that the "survival" method had not 
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Table III-2. Branch and local plant closings in rural Iowa, 1965-
1975* 
Year 
Closings 
Branch Local Total 
1965 5 7 12 
1966 2 3 5 
1967 1 2 3 
1968 8 4 12 
1969 5 4 9 
1970 12 4 16 
1971 7 2 9 
1972 4 9 13 
1973 10 4 14 
1974 10 7 17 
1975 11 7 18 
Total 75 53 128 
^Source: Appendix Table A-1. 
isolated. Because of this high degree of cooperation, it is my judg­
ment that this survey had located almost all of the rural Iowa manu­
facturers which had employed over twenty workers and outmigrated or 
ceased production during the last ten years. It is also my opinion 
that the information concerning each firm is accurate, though this 
accuracy is probably less for those plants closed several years ago. 
It should be noted at this time that two specific classes of 
firms have been segregated from the lists of migrating plants. The 
categories receiving separate consideration were the milk processors 
and fertilizer blending operations. They were excluded because: 
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(1) All creamery closings resulted from changes in milk process­
ing technology. The large number of new fertilizer blending 
plants that were constructed from 1965-1968 was due to the 
oil companies' attempts to establish retail outlets for 
their products. Since members of the above manufacturing 
groups reacted similarly to the "stresses" of the period, a 
case study of these firms was not warranted. 
(2) These migrations occurred in such great magnitude as to 
dominate the relationships to be estimated for Iowa firms. 
(3) It would have been extremely difficult to differentiate be­
tween plant openings and closings and mere name changes re­
sulting from mergers and acquisitions. 
Due to these problems, the creameries and fertilizer blending plants 
were analyzed separately. An explanation for the migration trends 
exhibited by the above industries is presented in Section B of the 
Appendix. 
In conclusion, the following information concerning rural Iowa 
plant openings and closings has been obtained. This data will be ana­
lyzed (using methods introduced in the following section) to determine 
the influence of ownership characteristics, plant size, product line, 
location, mergers, and business cycles on industrial migration. 
Plant openings (1963-1975) Plant closings (1965-1975) 
1. Iowa location 1. Iowa location 
2. Principal products 2. Principal products 
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Plant openings (1963-1975) 
3. Year of opening 
4. Ownership characteristics 
Plant closings (1965-1975) 
3. Year of closure 
4. Ownership characteristics 
5. Headquarters 5. Headquarters 
6. Reason for closing 
7. Ownership changes, i.e., 
mergers (if any) 
8. Peak employment 
B. Statistical Methods and Expected Relationships 
1. Migration rates 
It was previously hypothesized that the probability of a unit 
firm failing exceeded that of a multi-plant corporation, yet branch 
plants were still less locationally stable because of their greater 
propensities for migration. To test these hypotheses, outmigration 
rates were computed for the sample of closed Iowa firms. These migra­
tion rates are simply the ratio of the number of outmigrating firms in 
a select classification (SIC, employment size, branch plants, local 
plants, location, etc.) to the total number of rural Iowa manufacturers 
in such a category at a particular point in time (in this case 1973-74). 
Plant closures for the entire period of study (1965-1975) were Included 
in the computation of these rates to minimize the importance of cyclical 
variations in migrations. The denominators for the ratios were obtained 
from the 1973-1974 Directory of Iowa Manufacturers [18]. 
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If branch plants were in fact less locationally stable than unit 
concerns, their migration rates must be significantly greater than 
those of the indigenous plants.^ However, this rate differential does 
not conclusively prove that ownership characteristics were the source 
of the instability differences. Branches and local plants also differ 
in the types of products produced and in average plant size (see 
Tables III-3 and III-4). If a disproportionately large number of rural 
Iowa's branches were producing in "declining" or "footloose" industries, 
or if large plants were more responsive to changes in locational ad­
vantage than the smaller companies (possibly because of better access 
to the capital markets or superior management), the locational insta­
bility credited to ownership may have actually resulted from disparities 
in industrial composition and plant size. The influence of these vari= 
ables was controlled for by computing outmigration rates within select 
industrial and employment classes. Had multi-plant firms exhibited a 
greater propensity for plant closings due to the possibility of achiev­
ing scale economies and the relative absence of locational intertia, 
the outmigration rate of branches should exceed that of indigenous com­
panies regardless of the product type or employment categories utilized. 
A higher rate of closings for branches could also result if branch 
plants were more heavily concentrated in the higher transit cost western 
The statistical method used to test for significance of difference 
between two proportions is explained in Section B of the Appendix. 
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Table III-3. The employment characteristics of rural Iowa manufacturers, 
branch versus local, 1973-1974* 
Employment 
classes Local 
% of 
local Branch 
% of 
branch Total 
% of 
total 
21-50 263 62 112 32 375 48 
51-100 87 21 84 24 171 22 
101-250 50 12 93 27 143 18 
251-500 16 4 37 11 53 7 
501-1000 6 1 13 4 19 2 
1000+ 2 .5 11 3 13 2 
Total 424 350 774 
^Source; calculated from [18]. 
Table III-4. The Industrial composition of rural Iowa manufacturers, 
branch versus local, 1973-1974®' 
Ownership 
characteristics 
Industrial 
Durable 
composition^ 
Nondurable Total 
Branch 153 197 350 
Local 211 213 424 
Total 364 410 774 
^Source; calculated from [18]. 
^The deliniation between durable and nondurable goods is presented in 
Table A-5 of the Appendix. 
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region of the state than unit concerns.^ However, such a distribution 
did not occur. The proportion of the state's branch plants in each 
region (eastern and western Iowa) was almost identical to the propor­
tion of the state's unit firms in those areas (see Table III-5). Since 
no significant difference existed, controlling for the influence of 
location on long term migration rates was not necessary. 
Table III-5. The distribution of rural manufacturers between eastern 
and western Iowa, branch versus local, 1973-1974* 
Region 
Eastern Iowa Western Iowa 
% of % of 
Ownership branch branch 
characteristics Number or local Number or local 
Branch 232 66.3 118 33.7 
Local 261 61.6 163 38.4 
Total 493 281 
^Source: calculated from [18]. 
2. Plant migrations and the business cycle 
The ownership mix, branch versus local, of a community's manu­
facturers may also affect that community's unemployment rate over the 
business cycle. Branch plants should exhibit a greater propensity 
^The line of demarcation closely followed the route of Interstate 
Highway #35. 
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than unit firms for opening during prosperity and closing during a 
recession. If Iowa's branches were relatively more responsive to de­
mand fluctuations, the relationships graphed below (Figures III-l and 
III-2) will result from regressing plant openings and closings on 
the percentage change in GNP or Gross Iowa State Product (GSP).^ How­
ever, realization of these slope relationships does not guarantee that 
the ownership mix was responsible for the observed differences. Simi­
lar coefficients would have resulted if branch plants were more heavily 
concentrated than indigenous fiirms in the production of the most cy­
clically sensitive durable goods. Therefore, it is possible that the 
observed dissimilarity in unit and branch plant cyclical sensitivity 
resulted from differences in industrial composition and not ownership 
characteristics; the true relationship being disguised by correlation. 
To control for the influence of industrial mix, the sample Iowa open­
ings and closings were divided into durable and nondurable manufactur­
ers and again regressed against changes in GNP and GSP. If the coef­
ficients resulting from these regressions conform to the previous 
diagrams, it can be concluded that the ownership characteristics of an 
area's industry affect the severity of that region's business cycles. 
To obtain additional information on the patterns of plant migra­
tion, plant openings and closings will also be regressed quadratically 
^Plant openings and closings were regressed against current changes in 
GNP (no lag); percentage change in GNP lagged two, three, four, and 
six quarters; and the percentage change in GSP lagged two and six 
quarters. Examples of the above lags are provided in Tables A-3 and 
A-4 of the Appendix. 
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Plant closings 
per year 
Local/unit 
Branches 
0 
% A in lagged 
GNP (GSP) 
Branch closings = A + B(A GNP) 
Local closings = a + g(A GNP) 
Figure III-l. Hypothesized regression results for plant closings 
Branch openings = E + D(A GNP) 
Local openings = e + 3(A GNP) 
where D, 3 > 0 
D > 3 
Figure III-2. Hypothesized regression results for plant openings 
Plant openings 
per year 
Branches 
Local/unit 
0 
% A in lagged 
GNP (GSP) 
57 
on changes in GNP. If these regressions are significant and con­
form to Figures III-3 and III-4; plant migration may be susceptible to 
a "threshold" effect, i.e., the annual number of plant openings and 
closings will remain fairly stable until the change in GNP exceeds a 
certain level. An alternative pattern is what I shall refer to as the 
"accelerator" effect (Figures III-5 and III-6). Under the accelerator 
concept, annual plant openings and closings are fairly constant when 
the percentage growth rate of GNP is above a certain level. However, 
as the percentage change in GNP falls below this rate, plant closings 
increase and plant openings decline very rapidly. Intuitively, I find 
the "accelerator" effect for closings, and the "threshold" effect for 
openings, the most attractive of the four nonlinear relationships. 
3. Branch plant migration, eastern versus western Iowa 
The locational bias of cyclical industrial migrations will be 
tested by regressing crutnges in GNP on the branch and local plant open­
ings and closings of eastern and western Iowa (Tables III-6 and 111-7).^ 
Since most of the headquarters and markets for Iowa branches are located 
in the East, and since eastern Iowa is a part of the everenlarging 
Chicago industrial zone, western Iowa could be considered the more 
"geographically peripheral" region. If the findings of North [33], 
Krumme and Hayter [25], and Lever [27] are applicable to rural Iowa, 
^The line of demarcation closely follows the route of Interstate 
Highway #35. 
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Plant openings 
per year (Y) 
% A in lagged 
GNP (X) 
Y = 3o + 3^X + ggX 
where + Z&gX > 0 
gg > 0 
Figure III-3, "Threshold" effect for plant openings. 
Plant closings 
per year (Y) 
% A in lagged 
GNP (x) 
Y = 3o + B^X + ^ 2^ 
where 0^ + ZggX < 0 
&2 < 0 
Figure III-4. "Threshold" effect for plant closings. 
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Plant openings 
per year (Y) 
% A in lagged 
GNP (X) 
Y = 3o + 3iX + 
where 3^ + > 0 
6% < 0 
Figure III-5. "Accelerator" effect for plant openings 
Plant closings 
per year (Y) 
% A in lagged 
GNP (x) 
Y = Bg + 6iX + BgX^ 
where + ZggX < 0 
6% > 0 
Figure III-6. "Accelerator" effect for plant closings. 
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Table III-6. Annual branch and local plant openings for eastern and 
western Iowa, 1965-1975® 
Region 
Eastern Iowa Western Iowa 
Year Local Branch Total Local Branch Total 
1965 13 14 27 13 13 26 
1966 9 14 23 18 17 35 
1967 8 15 23 6 9 15 
1968 10 10 20 14 9 23 
1969 7 22 29 10 5 15 
1970 12 19 31 11 4 15 
1971 10 20 30 8 4 12 
1972 17 15 32 13 18 31 
1973 20 21 41 18 12 30 
1974 14 16 30 20 12 32 
1975 15 10 25 10 6 16 
Total 135 176 311 141. 109 250 
^Source; calculated from [14-19]. 
Table Ill--7 - Annual branch and local olant i closings for eastern and 
western Iowa, 1965-1975® 
Region 
Eastern Iowa Western Iowa 
Year Local Branch Total Local Branch Total 
1965 5 3 8 2 2 4 
1966 3 2 5 0 0 0 
1967 2 0 2 0 1 1 
1968 2 7 9 2 1 3 
1969 3 4 7 I 1 2 
1970 1 4 5 . 3 8 11 
1971 0 5 5 2 2 4 
^Source: Appendix Table A-1. 
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Table III-7 (Continued) 
Year 
Eastern Iowa 
Region 
Western Iowa 
Local Branch Total Local Branch Total 
1972 7 2 9 2 2 4 
1973 2 1 9 2 3 5 
1974 6 5 11 1 5 6 
1975 2 7 9 5 4 9 
Total 33 46 79 20 29 49 
western branch plant migrations should be more cyclically sensitive 
than those of eastern Iowa, This sensitivity difference is indicated 
2 by steeper slopes and higher R 's for the regressions on western branch 
openings and closings than on eastern migrations. 
4. Mergers and locational instability 
Finally, the outmigration rates of acquired firms were estimated 
to determine if mergers affected the locational stability of rural manu­
facturers. These rates are simply the ratio of the number of merged 
firms that closed their plants within two years after being acquired to 
the total number of rural Iowa manufacturers that were acquired from 
1965-1975. Unfortunately, no data was available on the number of Iowa 
firms that merged furing the period of study; therefore, this informa­
tion had to be estimated. The following two procedures were applied to 
determine a proxy for the base. 
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1) Estimation from Current National Data; 
Assume that every manufacturing plant in the U.S. had an equal 
probability of being acquired. In 1967, rural Iowa had .575 percent 
of the nation's manufacturing plants with employment greater than 20 
[43]. This percent had increased to .612 by 1972 [44]. Given the 
above assumption, approximately .594 percent of the nation's acquired 
plants should have resided in Iowa. From 1965 through 1975, about 
10,652 mergers concerning manufacturing plants occurred with the United 
States [45, 46]. The estimated number of acquisitions that were con­
summated in the study area is .594 percent of 10,652 or 63. 
2) Estimation from Past Iowa Data; 
Again assume that every manufacturing plant in the nation had an 
equal probability of being acquired. From 1955 through 1968, 110 Iowa 
companies were acquired by "out of state" firms, an average of 7.86 
mergers per year [5]. Assuming that the average annual merger rate for 
1965 to 1975 did not differ greatly from that of 1955 to 1968 (see 
Table III-8), approximately 86 Iowa firms were acquired during the 
eleven years covered by this study. Non-SMSA Iowa had an average of 
59 percent (59.7 percent in 1972 and 58.1 percent in 1967) of Iowa's 
plants with an employment greater than 20 [43, 44]; therefore,59 per­
cent of 86, or 51 mergers should have occurred in rural Iowa from 1965 
to 1975. Since the merger data from which this base was derived did 
not include the acquisition of Iowa companies by in-state corporations, 
the estimate of 51 firms is biased downward. 
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Table III-8. Acquisitions of manufacturing firms, United States, 
1955-1975* 
Year Number Year Number 
1955 491 1966 826 
1956 569 1967 1,261 
1957 506 1968 1,948 
1958 503 1969 1,766 
1959 734 1970 1,045 
1960 742 1971 760 
1961 780 1972 627 
1962 744 1973 578 
1963 716 1974 500 est. 
1964 712 1975 500 est. 
1965 826 
^Source; [45, 46]. 
^The 1975 Statistical Abstract of the United States did not have merger 
data for 1974 and 1975. The 1974 and 1975 figures are estimates made 
by the author and based on extrapolation. 
The above estimates of 63 and 51 will be used to calculate the 
outmigration rates for merged firms. 
To ascertain if particular forms of mergers (horizontal, product 
extension, market extension, vertical, or conglomerate) were more detri­
mental to the locational stability of the acquired firm than others, 
migration rates were calculated according to the type of acquisition. 
However» the denominators for these migration ratios also had to be 
estimated before any comparisons could be attempted. No data were 
available pertaining to the percent of U.S. mergers of each type, but 
the percentage distribution of assets acquired in large mergers was 
procurred for the period 1964 to 1972 (Table III-9). If there existed 
Table III-9. Distribution of assets acquired in large mergers by type and period (percentages)^ 
1964-67 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972^ 1973-75*^ 
Horizontal 11.4 4.2 19.4 15.2 20.4 30.0 15.0 
Market extension 8.7 5.9 3.1 4.2 2.2 0.0 5.6 
Vertical 8.9 7.2 7.7 4.5 3.2 7.6 7.3 
Subtotal 29.9 17.3 30.2 23.9 25.8 37.6 27.9 
Product extension 49.9 39.0 31.7 43.6 30.8 44.5 43.2 
Pure conglomerate 21.2 43.6 38.1 32.5 43.4 17.9 28.8 
Subtotal 71.1 82.6 69.8 76.1 74.2 62.4 72.1 
TOTAL*^ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
^Source: [39, p. 24]. 
^Excludes companies for which data not publicly available. The FTC is now revising all series to 
exclude such companies. The exclusion does not alter the trends. 
^The 1973-1975 data were not available. The percentages reported for the 1973-1975 period are the 
averages for the preceding nine years (K964-1972)„ 
'^Details do not always add to totals due to rounding. 
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little bias in the size of firms acquired in each type of larger merger, 
the percentage distribution of assets will provide a good proxy for 
the percentage distribution of firms by merger type. By applying these 
percentages to the total number of U.S. manufacturing firms acquired 
annually (Table III-8), the number of U.S. mergers of each category was 
obtained. From this data, the number of rural Iowa mergers of each 
type was estimated using the methods previously discussed. Table III-IO 
provides the results of these estimating procedures. 
Table III-IO. Estimated number of rural Iowa mergers by type of 
acquisition, 1964-1975& 
Type of acquisition 
Estimation Hori- Market Product Conglom-
method Total zontal extension extension Vertical erate 
Current 
U.S. data 63 9 3 25 5 20 
Past Iowa 
data 51 7 3 21 4 16 
^Source; derived from Table XII-8. 
If the Ideational stability of rural Iowa manufacturers was af­
fected by mergers as previously hypothesized, the migration rates of 
the acquired firms should be significantly greater than those of in­
digenous companies. Since this locational instability differential was 
predicted to result primarily from horizontal mergers, acquisitions of 
this type should exhibit the highest rate of outmigration. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS^ 
A. Long Term Plant Outmigration Rates 
1. Branch plants versus local firms 
The statistical findings of this study (Table IV-1) provide strong 
support for the previous hypotheses. The probability of a local com­
pany failing exceeded that of a multi-plant firm. Plant closures re­
sulting from branch and local company failures were 19 and 37, respec­
tively. These represented 5.43 percent of the 1973-74 base for multi-
plant firms and 8.73 percent for local concerns. However, in spite of 
a lower bankruptcy rate, Iowa branch plants were still less locationally 
stable than Indigenous manufacturers. The migration rate of branches 
was approximately 50 percent greater than that of local firms, and this 
differential was not significantly influenced by the location of the 
fflultl-plant corporations headquarters (Iowa vs. not Iowa). 
2. Migration by employment size 
The difference in branch and unit firm migration rates cannot be 
attributed to a skewed distribution of plant sizes. There existed no 
significant differences among the rates of the five smallest employment 
classes (Table IV-2)= Also, the outmigration rates for branches and 
local plants of most size categories were quite similar to those derived 
^The data used for the calculation of all migration rates is presented 
in the previous chapter and the Appendix; therefore, no table sources 
will be provided. 
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Table IV-1. Outmigration rates for branch and local plants, non-SMSA 
Iowa, 1965-1975 
Ownership 
characteristics 
Migration rates 
(expressed as a percent) 
Local 12.50*1 ***** 
Branch 21.43J 
Branch (HQ in Iowa) 24.53 
Branch (HQ not in Iowa) 21.21 
All rural Iowa plants 16.54 
***** 
Significantly different at the .5 percent level. 
Table IV-2. Outmigration rates for rural Iowa plants according to 
size of employment, branch versus local, 1965-1975 
Employment 
classes 
Outmigration rates 
(expressed as a percent) 
Aggregate Branch Local 
21-50 15.73 22.32 12.93 
51-100 18.71 26.19 12.64 
100-250 17.48 17.20 10.00 
251-500 15.09 16.22 12.50 
501-1000 15.79 15.38 16.67 
1000+ 30.77 — —  
All Iowa plants 16.54 21.43 12.50 
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from the aggregate sample (21.4% and 12.5%, respectively). The loca­
tional instability of branches actually fell as branch plant size in­
creased; therefore, if a size factor had existed, it would have con­
tributed to smaller, not larger, branch plant migration rates. 
3. Outmigration and industrial composition 
The locational stability of rural Iowa's manufacturers was 
significantly affected by the type of products they produced (Table 
IV-3). The manufacturers of durable goods exhibited outmigration rates 
significantly larger than the producers of nondurable goods, and the 
locational instability of firms in the electrical and lumber industries 
was significantly greater than that of all Iowa plants. Still, within 
product groups, branch plants were more locationally unstable than 
indigenous firms. The branch plant propensity to outmigrate was sig­
nificantly greater than that of unit firms for all product classifica­
tions except nondurable goods= Multi-plant corporations in the elec­
trical equipment and wood products industries had instability rates 
significantly higher than those of other Iowa branch plants. The 
relatively large migration rates for branches of these SIC's may have 
resulted from the following factors: 
1) The lumber and electrical industries are engaged in the pro­
duction of durable goods, and therefore, more susceptible to 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. 
2) The South and Japan had developed comparative advantages in 
the production of wood products and electrical equipment. 
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Table IV-3. Outmigration rates of rural lowa manufacturers according 
to types of goods produced and ownership characteristics, 
1965-1975 
Product classification 
Outmigration rates 
(expressed as a percent) 
All 
plants Branch Local 
Durable goods 
Nondurable goods 
Food and kindred products 
(SIC #20) 
Electrical equipment and 
supplies (SIC #36) 
Lumber, wood products, 
furniture, and fixtures 
(SIC #24 and #25) 
All Iowa manufacturers 
19.78 
13.55 
20.11 
] ** 
[ 
28.26 -I 
25.86 
16.54 
** 
(28.10 
16.24 
(24.42 
(41.67 
(43.75 
(21.43 
13.74) 
11.27 
14.77)' 
***** 
13.64) 
** 
19.04) 
** 
12.50) 
***** 
^Significantly different at the 10 percent level. 
**Significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
Significantly different at the .5 percent level. 
respectively. Competition from these regions forced Iowa 
manufacturers to seek "lower cost" locations. 
The locational instability of indigenous firms varied little among 
the product classes. With the exception of the wood products manu­
facturers, the migration rates within the SIC's never varied more than 
three percent from the Iowa average for unit concerns» Therefore, the 
differences between the aggregate migration rates of each product 
group resulted primarily from changes in branch plant Instability. 
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In conclusion, the locational instability of a region's industry 
will be affected by that region's industrial composition. However, 
that instability will be transmitted to the industrial base through 
the area's branch plants. The outmigration rates of a community's 
manufacturers will be only minutely altered by product mix if all the 
community's industries are locally owned. 
4. Outmigration and plant location 
Location (eastern Iowa versus western Iowa) had no significant 
influence on the long term migration rates of rural Iowa branch and 
local plants (Table IV-4). The locational instability of indigenous 
Table IV-4. Outmigration rates of eastern and western Iowa plants, 
branch versus local, 1965-1975 
Location 
All 
plants 
Outmigration rates 
Branch 
plants 
Local 
plants 
Eastern Iowa 
Western Iowa 
Iowa 
16.02 
17.44 
16.54 
(19.83 
(24.58 
(21.43 
12.54) 
12.26)' 
12.50)' 
** 
**** 
***** 
Significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
**** , , 
Significantly different at the 1 percent level, 
***** 
Significantly different at the .5 percent level. 
firms in each region was almost identical to the state average for 
local concerns. The outmigration rate of western branch plants exceeded 
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that of eastern branches, but not by a statistically significant 
amount. However, in all regions, branch plants were significantly 
less locationally stable than unit concerns. Controlling for location 
did not alter the migration rate differential between branch and local 
firms. 
5. Mergers and plant locational stability 
From 1965 through 1975 thirteen rural Iowa manufacturers failed 
or migrated within two years after merging with another company (Table 
IV-5). All of these firms participated in the types of mergers in­
herently consistent with subsequent plant closures; i.e., horizontal, 
market extension, and product extension. Five of the acquisitions 
(Embalming Burial Case, Continental Manufacturing, Johnson Block, 
Vilas, and Bonaparte Rendering) were treated as strictly horizontal 
mergers. There existed some question as to whether Nefco, Silent 
SiouXj Randolph FoodS; Anamosa Gonorete. Marshalltown Foundry- and 
Comfort were horizontal or market extension mergers. So as not to bias 
the migration rates in favor of the hypothesis, these six "ambiguous" 
acquisitions were classified in the latter category. 
The outmigration rates of the acquired firms (Table IV-6) provide 
some support for the previous hypothesis. The merged plants migration 
rate was significantly greater than that of indigenous concerns, but 
no more so than that of branch plants. Companies acquired through 
horizontal mergers were quite locationally unstable, exhibiting an out­
migration rate double that of branch plants. The locational instability 
Table IV-5. Iowa manufacturing plants which closed within two years after being acquired by another 
company, 1965-1975 
Iowa firm Acquiring firm Type of merger^ 
Approximate 
lag between 
merger and 
closing 
(in years) 
Ajax Manufacturing Co. Chromalloy American Corp. PE 1 
Embalming Burial Case Co. Iowa Casket Co. H 1 
Continental Manufacturing Co. Big Smith, Inc. H 0 
Silent Sioux Corp. Metal Engineering Corp. H or ME 1 
Randolph Foods, Inc. Seymour Foods H or ME 0 
Anamosa Concrete Products Van Dale Corp. H or ME 1 
Johnson Block Co. Tantex Corp. H 0 
Marshalltown Foundry Co. Grey Iron Foundry H or ME 2 
Comfort Inc. Pontiac Chairs H or ME 2 
Vilas Co. Thompson Industries H 0 
Bonaparte Rendering Co. National By-Products H 1 
Frito-Lay Co. NefCO Co. H or ME 2 
Atlas Motor Homes AMF, Inc. PE 2 
^ - Horizontal. 
ME - Market extension. 
PE - Product extension. 
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Table IV-6. Outmigration rates for acquired firms by merger type, 
rural Iowa, 1965-1975* 
Outmigration rates 
Merger type (expressed as percents) 
All mergers 
Horizontal 
Horizontal, product extension, 
and market extension 
All Iowa plants 
Local 
Branch (including mergers)^ 
Branch (excluding mergers) 
*The instability rates were calculated using the bases estimated from 
current national data. If significant differences existed with this 
base, they will also exist when the migration rates are derived using 
bases estimated from past Iowa data. 
^In calculating the outmigration rate of Iowa branches, the acquired 
firms were considered branch plants and therefore included. 
* 
Signiricantly dirrèrént ât the 10 percent level. 
**Significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
***Significantly different at the 2.5 percent level. 
of plants engaged in horizontal, product extension, and market exten­
sion mergers was also quite high, approximately 50 percent greater than 
that of branch plants. If the denominators from which the above migra­
tion rates were calculated are accurate, it may be concluded that 
horizontal and market extension mergers reduce the locational stability 
of the acquired firm. 
*** [ 20.63. 
55.56 
r34.21 
*** 
12.50-
21.43 
. 18 .02-
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The above migration rates may somewhat exaggerate the influence 
of acquisitions on stability. As stated previously, horizontal mergers 
were often initiated to insure a market of sufficient magnitude to 
permit efficient production. If the merged firms were operating in­
efficiently at the time of their acquisition, the probability of their 
failing in the absence of merger should have been greater than that 
of the "average" rural Iowa plant. The thirteen acquired firms might 
have exhibited a greater propensity to close than other Iowa companies 
even without merging. 
6. Summary of the findings 
The influence of plant ownership characteristics, plant size, 
product mix, plant location, and mergers on the long terra outmigration 
rates of rural manufacturers has been analyzed. All the above vari­
ables except plant size and location had a statistically significant 
iïïipact en the location stability of Iowa's firms. The behavior of 
branch and unit firm outmigration was consistent with the previous 
theory. The outmigration rates of branch plants always exceeded those 
of indigenous firms, and these rate differentials were not altered by 
cross-classifying ownership characteristics with product mix, plant 
size, or plant location. In light of the above findings, it must be 
concluded that the ownership characteristics of a community's manu­
facturers will affect the Ideational stability of that community's in­
dustrial base. 
75 
B. Plant Migration and Business Cycles^ 
1. Branch plants versus unit plants 
a. Plant closings Branch and unit firm closings had behaved 
in a manner consistent with the theory presented in Chapter II, i.e., 
branch plant outmigration was significantly more responsive to fluctua­
tions in GNP than the migration of local manufacturers (Table IV-7). 
Regardless of the lag utilized (see Tables A-3 and A-4 of the Appendix 
for an explanation of these lags), branch closings were inversely 
related to the growth rate of GNP and GSP. Also, the branch plant's 
marginal propensity for closing (3) always exceeded that of the local 
firms, though the slopes were no longer significantly different from 
zero when GSP was the independent variable. The shortest lags (no 
lag, two and three quarter lags) provided the highest explanatory 
values and most significant coefficients. Such a quick response in­
dicates that the downturn in a region's economy attributed to plant 
ownership characteristics will closely follow the national cycle. 
The small and insignificant slope coefficients and the extremely 
low coefficients of determination and F values imply that the closures 
and outmigration of Indigenous firms were influenced only minutely by 
2 
cyclical fluctuations. The R 's and F's for branch closings were also 
^The following results pertain only to the linear regressions of 
changes in GNP and GSP on plant openings and closings; With the ex­
ception of two cases, the quadratic regressions failed to improve on 
the results provided by the linear regressions. These exception will 
be noted in this section. The remainder of the quadratic results are 
contained in Tables A-6 to A-11 of the Appendix. 
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low, but markedly greater than those of the local firms. It would 
have been unrealistic to expect a closer "fit" when only one explana­
tory variable was utilized. A review of the reasons for factory 
closings indicates that many of the factors were completely unrelated 
to demand fluctuations; e.g., union troubles, plants destroyed by 
fire (in one case the owners were suspected of arson), the demise of 
mussels in the Mississippi River, and closings resulting from OSHA or 
antipollution regulations. 
b. Plant openings The relationships between plant openings 
and changes in GNP (Table IV-8) also support the hypothesis that 
branches are more sensitive to cyclical variations than unit firms. 
With the exception of no lag in GNP, the branch plant marginal pro­
pensities for openings (B) were always significantly different from 
zero and exceeded those of the local concerns. Only when regressed 
against lagged GSP did indigenous and multi-plant corporations behave 
similarly. 
Branch plant openings were not as quick to respond to prosperity 
as closings were to a recession. The three and four quarter lags in 
GNP provided the highest coefficients of determination and F values, 
and most significant slope coefficients. A shorter lag for closings 
should be expected since the process of transferring production else­
where is less time consuming than constructing a new facility or 
negotiating for an existing plant. A generally cautious nature on the 
part of multi-plant managers would also result in such a lag dif­
ferential. 
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Table IV-7. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of local 
and branch plant closings per year on the percentage 
change in GNP and GSP lagged from zero to six quarters, 
1965-1975 
Y Slope 
Lag Intercept (g) R 2 
No lag in GNP * 
Branch 8.759 -.618 .307 3.99 
Local 4.621 .066 .009 .09 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 8.878 -.715 .386 5.68 
Local 5.175 -.129 .034 .32 
Three quarter lag in GNP * 
Branch 8.426 -.541 .287 3.63 
Local 5.272 -.162 .069 .67 
Four quarter lag in GNP * 
Branch 8.577 -.517 .228 2.66 
Local 5.119 -.093 .021 .18 
Six quarter lag in GNP * 
Branch 9.110 -.666 .225 2.61 
Local 5.279 -.139 .026 .25 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Branch 7.582 -.226 .145 1.53 
Local 4.928 -.037 .011 .09 
Six quarter lag in GSP 
Branch 7.353 -.125 .041 .38 
Local 4.813 .0015 .000 .00 
* • 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
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Table IV-8. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of local 
and branch plant openings per year on the percentage 
change in GNP and GSP lagged from zero to six quarters, 
1963-1975 
Lag Intercept 
Slope 
(3) R 
No lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
25.231 .236 
26.580 -.107 
.020 .23 
.002 .02 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
22.827 
25.230 
1.097 
.555 
**** 
.430 7.53 
.005 .59 
*** 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 22.681 1,104 
Local 25.171 .552 
***** 
.549 
.007 
12.17 
.75 
***** 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
21.594 1.293 
23.302 .860 
**** 
.630 
.130 
18.84 
1.64 
***** 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
21.597 
23.891 
1.259 
.668 
*** 
.362 6.24 
.047 .55 
*** 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Branch 
Local 
25.542 
24.824 
.338 
.374 
.019 
.075 
2.42 
.81  
Six quarter lag in GSP 
Branch 
Local 
23.892 
24.180 
.550, 
.534' 
*** 
.349 
.152 
5.90 
1.98 
*** 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level; 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Significant at the .5 percent level. 
**** 
***** 
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Branch plant openings appear to be susceptible to a mild "thresh­
old" effect, i.e., plant inmigration increased at an increasing rate 
as the percentage change in GNP rose. When a three or four quarter 
lag in GNP was regressed (using a quadratic equation) on branch open­
ings, both the first and second derivatives were positive and the F 
values were significant at the .05 level [Equations (3) and (4)]. 
A plant inmigration pattern with a "threshold" effect will possibly 
Y = 21.134 + 1.067X + .032%^ (F = 7.43) 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Y = 22.219 + .987% + .014%^ (F = 4.70) 
Three quarter lag in GNP (4) 
induce an even greater procyclical Impact on local employment than a 
strictly linear relationship between changes in GNP and plant openings. 
Fluctuations in the growth rates of GNP and 6SP were no more 
helpful in explaining unit firm openings than they had been in pre­
dicting closures. The marginal propensities for local openings were 
much larger (and for the six quarter lag in GSP also significant) 
than those for plant closings, but the F values of the regression 
equations were still too small to attribute much importance to the 
coefficients. It would appear that business cycles had only a minor 
(if any) influence on the local entreprenuers' decisions to initiate; 
halt, or transfer their operations. In light of the above findings. 
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it must be concluded that openings and closings of rural Iowa's branch 
plants were more responsive to changes in aggregate demand than those 
of indigenous firms. 
2. Durable versus nondurable 
It is possible that the above dissimilarities in local and branch 
plant cyclical sensitivity was due to differences in industrial composi­
tion and not ownership mix. The results of regressing openings and 
closings of durable and nondurable manufacturers against changes in GNP 
and GSP (Tables IV-9 and IV-10 respectively) indicate that the producers 
of durable goods were more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations than non­
durable manufacturers. With only the exception of a zero lag in GNP, 
members of the durable goods industries exhibited a greater marginal 
propensity to open during prosperity and close during a recession than 
firms producing nondurables. However, the F values for the regression 
equations imply that the relationship between product mix and plant mi­
gration for most lags was weak. 
The timing of plant openings for durable and nondurable goods 
producers was similar. Members of both groups responded best to four 
and six quarter lags in GNP and a six quarter lag in GSP. Durable 
manufacturers had reacted slightly more rapidly in closing their plants 
after a fall in aggregate demand than they had in initiating production 
during prosperity. The two» three» four, and six quarter lags in GNP 
all provided slope coefficients of equal significance and comparable 
R *s. The closings of nondurable manufacturers were not influenced 
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Table IV-9. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of dura­
ble and nondurable plant openings per year on the per­
centage change in GNP and GSP lagged from zero to six 
quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope 
Lag Intercept (3) R 
Four quarter lag in GNP * 
Durable 25.300 1.119** .280 3.50* 
Nondurable 18.639 .450 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
** 
*** 
2 
No lag in GNP 
Durable 30.373 -.490 .051 .48 
Nondurable 19.492 .200 .059 .56 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Durable 27.631 .464* .043 .40 
Nondurable 18.924 .423 .249 2.98 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Durable 26.836 .740* .141 1.47 
Nondurable 19.107 .351 .215 2.56 
Six quarter lag in GNP * 
Durable 25.023 1.175** .183 2.02 
Nondurable 18.198 .572 .304 3.95 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Durable 27.604 .438 .144 1.51 
Nondurable 19.613 .160 .139 1.40 
Six quarter lag in GSP * * 
Durable 26.740 .612*** .255 3.09** 
Nondurable 19.017 .302 .438 7.04 
82 
Table IV-10. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of 
durable and nondurable plant closings per year on the 
percentage change in GNP and GSP lagged from zero to 
six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope _ 
Lag Intercept (3) R 
No lag in GNP 
Durable 7.748 -.402 .174 1.88 
Nondurable 5.353 -.088 .010 .09 
Two quarter lag in GNP ^ 
Durable 7.855 -.476 .229 2.66 
Nondurable 6.015 -.336 .135 1.41 
Three quarter lag in GNP ^ 
Durable 7.667 -.400 .211 2.38 
Nondurable 5.887 -.284 .121 1.30 
Four quarter lag in GNP * 
Durable 7.984 -.446 .226 2.63 
Nondurable 5=621 -,164 .033 .34 
* . _ 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Durable 8.636 -.632 ,266 3.33 
Nondurable 5.716 -.189 .029 .27 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Durable 7.030 -.162 ,101 1.00 
Nondurable 5.316 -.075 .026 .24 
Six quarter lag in GSP 
Durable 6.910 -.104 .037 .35 
Nondurable 5.273 -.051 .011 .10 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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greatly by cyclical fluctuation in aggregate demand. None of the 
slope coefficients for nondurable plant closings were significant, and 
the regression F values were never respectable (.10 to 1.41). 
The above findings are consistent with Borts' study [4]; however, 
the disparities in branch and unit plant cyclical migrations cannot 
be attributed solely to product differences. The results of regressing 
durable and nondurable local and branch plant migrations against 
changes in GNP (Tables IV-11 and IV-12) indicate that ownership charac­
teristics were an explanatory variable. As should be expected, the 
migration rates of branches producing durable goods were by far the 
most responsive to cyclical variations in aggregate demand. But re­
gardless of whether the firm was a manufacturer of durable or nondur­
able products, branch plants exhibited a stronger procyclical behavior. 
When any type of lag was instituted, the branches of both durable and 
nondurable industries had higher marginal propensities to open than 
similar indigenous corporations. Not only were nondurable branches 
more responsive than nondurable local manufacturers, they were also 
more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand than durable unit con­
cerns. For the two, three, and four quarter lags, nondurable branch 
plant's marginal propensities to open always exceeded those of the in­
digenous manufscturars of durable goods. 
Branch plants producing durable goods closed more rapidly during 
a recession and opened more slowly during prosperity than did non­
durable branches. The lags providing the most significant coefficients 
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Table IV-11. Coefficients resulting from regressing the annual number 
of branch and local plant closings, durable versus non­
durable, on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero 
to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope 
Lag Intercept (3) R F 
No lag in GNP 
(LoSf 
5.449 
2.579 
—. 484 
.019 
.303 
.003 
3.92 
.02 
Nondurable 3.311 2.042 
-.134 
.047 
.064 
.011 
.61 
.10 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
5.291 
2.747 
-.469* 
-.040 
.268 
.011 
3.29* 
.10 
Nondurable 3.587 
2.428 
•k 
-.246 
-.089 
.200 
.043 
2.28 
.35 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
_ ,_ rBranch 
Durable ( ^ocal 
4.988 
2.823 
* 
-.352 
-.067 
.196 
.038 
2.19 
. 36 
>T J t-1 / Branch 
Nondurable { ^ocal 
3.439 
2.449 
-.189 
-.095 
.152 
.055 
1.64 
.52 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
_ , 1 r Branch 
Durable i. . 
Local 
5.289 
2.787 
-.400" 
-.047 
.222 
.016 
2.52 
.15 
„ , VI / Branch 
Nondurable 1 t Local 
3.289 
2.332 
-.118 
-.047 
.052 
.011 
.49 
.10 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Durable ( 
Local 
5.662 
3.011 
-.503* 
-.113 
.207 
.060 
2.34 
.54 
X T  J  1 . 1 /  Branch Nondurable {. . 
Local 
3.448 
2.268 
-.163 
-,026 
.061 
.002 
.57 
.02 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table IV-12. Coefficients resulting from regressing the annual number 
of branch and local plant openings, durable versus non­
durable, on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero 
to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope 2 
Lag Intercept (B) R F 
No lag in GNP 
Nondurable 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Durable { 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
12.04 .105* .007 .09 
18.44 -.607 .171 2.26 
12.48 .160 .031 .35 
7.71 .159 .022 .24 
rBranch 10.67 .568 .218 3.07 
Durable {Lo^al 16.66 -.065 .002 .02 
Nondurable { Branch 11.51 .492** .287 4.43** 
Local 7.52 .234 .045 .52 
JU 
Branch 10=46 ,626 .338 5.60 
Local 16.05 .135 .010 .12 
** * 
M A /Branch 11.71 .421 .267 4.01 
N o n d u r a b l e  { 7 . 7 2  . 1 6 7  . 0 2 9  . 3 3  
.**** , __*** 
rBranch 9.78 .765 .424 6.63 
Durablet^^^ai 15.18 .377 .068 .66 
** * 
M J 1,1 r Branch 11.45 .456 .263 3.93 
N o n d u r a b l e  { 7 . 6 5  . 1 7 0  . 0 2 6  . 2 9  
Six quarter lag in GNP * 
Durable { Branch 10.00 .680 .203 2.79 
Local 15.01 .415 .049 .58 
Branch 11.37 .465* .166 2.18 
Local 7.51 .207 .023 .26 
* 
** 
*** 
**** 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
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and the best fit for branch closings were the "no lag" for durables 
2 (3 = -.484, R = .303) and the two quarter lag for nondurables (3 = 
2 
-.246, R = .200). For plant openings, durable branches responded 
2 best to a four quarter lag in GNP (3 = .765, R = .424), while the 
two quarter lag explained most accurately the openings of nondurable 
2 branches (3 = .492, R = .287). Therefore, regions with a large con­
centration of branches producing durable goods will closely follow the 
nation into a recession, but they will not return to full employment as 
rapidly as areas engaged primarily in the production of nondurables.. 
The responsiveness of unit plant openings and closings to varia­
tions in the GNP depended little on whether the facility was producing 
durable or nondurable goods. In either case, almost no relationship 
existed. Local entreprenuers did initiate production with greater 
frequency during a prosperous period, and close plants more readily 
during a recession; however, their marginal propensities to open and 
close were consistently below those of branch plants. The F values of 
the regression equations were also so low (from .09 to .66) that little 
significance can be attributed to these slopes. Only when local dur­
able and nondurable plant openings were regressed against a six quarter 
2 
lag in GSP were significant coefficients and somewhat respectable R 's 
achieved (Table IV-13). Since indigenous manufacturers are primarily 
engaged in servicing a local market, a closer relationship with GSP 
than GNP should be expected. However, even this relationship was 
relatively weak. 
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Table IV-13. Coefficients resulting from regressing the annual number 
of branch and local plant openings, durable versus non­
durable, on the percentage change in GSP lagged two and 
six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope _ 
Lag Intercept (3) R F 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Branch 11.23 .348 
Local 16.28 .054 
Branch 12.64 .109 
Local 8.05 .055 
Durable { 
** .296 3.78* 
.005 
.051 1.16 
.009 .09 
Branch 11.44 .246. 
.378 
** 
.134 1.70 
Local 15.01 .210 2.92 
* 
Branch 12.04 .250 .242 3.51 
Local 7.64 .154 .063 .74 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
* 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
The previous results indicate that industrial oi-mership charac­
teristics will affect the transmission and severity of cyclical im­
pulses to regions. Areas whose production is dominated by branch 
plants (regardless of whether they are durable or nondurable) will 
tend to exhibit cyclical fluctuations in manufacturing employment 
larger than those regions with primarily indigenous firms. Communities 
attempting to attract new industry should realize that the addition of 
"footloose" branch plants will reduce the stability of its industrial 
base and add a procyclical factor to its local economy. 
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3. The locational bias of cyclical plant migrations 
The results of regressing eastern and western plant openings and 
closings on changes in GNP and GSP (Tables IV-14 and IV-15) are con­
sistent with the previous theory. Plant migrations resulting from 
cyclical variations were not geographically distributed in an unbiased 
fashion. The marginal propensities of western plant openings and clos­
ings exceeded those of eastern Iowa for every lag. The western region 
had not only the highest coefficients of determination but also all of 
the significant F values and slopes. These results indicate that the 
"geographically peripheral" half of the state was responsible for most 
of the cyclical flustuations exhibited by Iowa plants. 
The somewhat surprising phenomena was the great dissimilarity be­
tween the two regions' marginal propensities for plant openings. Plant 
inmigration into western Iowa showed a much stronger relative response 
to prosperity than that into eastern Iowa. Through interviews with new 
Area V manufacturers I was able to obtain their reasons for selecting 
northwest Iowa. Two of the factors frequently mentioned help to ex­
plain the attractiveness of this area during boom periods. First, 
there existed a number of factories available for immediate occupancy. 
In some cases, these plants were vacated during the preceding reces­
sions. Secondly, labor was readily available in western Iowa. These 
characteristics made western Iowa a favorable location to "accommodate 
the temporary peak production" that exists during high growth periods. 
Within the two regions, branch plant migrations were generally more 
sensitive to changes in aggregate demand than those of unit concerns 
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Table IV-14. Coefficients resulting from regressing (linear) the num­
ber of eastern and western Iowa plant openings per year 
on the percentage change in GNP and GSP lagged from 
zero to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Lag 
Y Slope 
Intercept (3) 
No lag in GNP 
West 
East 
21.967 
28.858 
.254 
-.196 
.012 
.011 
. 1 0  
. 1 2  
Two quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
19.312 
27.914 
1.241 
.130 
.239 
.006 
2 . 8 1  
.05 
Three quarter lag in GNP ^ 
West 19.500 1.151 
East 27.331 .336 
. 266 
.049 
3.26 
.47 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
West 17.627 1.581 
East 26,956 .408 
*** 
.436 
.064 
5.96 
. 6 1  
*** 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
16.773 
27.566 
1.801 
.214 
** 
.336 
.010 
4.56 
.09 
.** 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
West 
East 
21 .222  
27.236 
.505 
.348 
.148 
.153 
1.58 
1.63 
Six quarter lag in GSP 
West 
East 
19.540 
27.954 
.899 
.090 
.431 
.009 
6.82 
.09 
*** 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
***Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
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Table IV-15. Coefficients resulting from regressing (linear) the an­
nual number of eastern and western Iowa plant closings on 
the percentage change in GNP and GSP lagged from zero to 
six quarters, 1965-1975 
Lag 
Y Slope 
Intercept (B) R 
No lag in GNP 
West 
East 
5.601 
7.499 
-.383 
- .106 
.159 1.72 
.019 .17 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
6.418 
7.451 
-.713 
-.098 
**** 
.522 9.84 
.014 .14 
, **** 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
West 6.131 -.598' 
East 7.422 -.086 
**** 
.477 8.18 
.014 .14 
**** 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
West 6.287 -.568' 
East 7,318 -.042 
** 
.374 
.003 
5.37 
.03 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
6.850 
7.502 
-.724 
-.097 
.** 
.361 
.010 
5.09 
.09 
** 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
West 
East 
5.113 
7.233 
- . 2 2 1  
-.017 
,187 
.002 
2 . 1 0  
.02 
Six quarter lag in GSP 
West 
East 
5.092 
7.094 
-.179 
.025 
.114 
.003 
1 . 1 6  
.03 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
****Signifleant at the 1 percent level. 
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(Tables IV-16 and IV-17). Eastern and western lowa branches exhibited 
greater propensities to open than local firms in their areas for all 
five lags in GNP. However, the openings of western indigenous firms 
were always more sensitive to cyclical variations than those of eastern 
branch plants. The relatively large coefficients for the regressions 
on western local openings indicate that plant location will affect 
the cyclical migration rates of unit as well as branch firms. 
The coefficients obtained from regressing eastern and western 
branch and local plant outmigration on changes in GNP (Table IV-17) 
indicate that branch plants closed more readily than unit concerns 
during a recession. However, for the longest lags (four and six 
quarters), local western firms exhibited a greater marginal propensity 
for closing than western branch plants. Furthermore, the pattern of 
local firm closings in western Iowa exhibited a mild "accelerator" 
effect, i.e., plant failures and outmigration increased at an increas­
ing rate as the percentage change in GNP declined (Table IV-18). This 
result was expected. As the previous theory predicted, the most 
"geographically peripheral" firms, whether branch or local, will be 
strongly affected by changes in demand. When the growth in aggregate 
demand slowed or became negative, multi-plant firms attempted to main­
tain an efficient operation by consolidating production» The branches 
first to be closed were those on the periphery of the market area. 
Unit firms did not have the option of consolidating production, except 
through mergers. However, if the local company was covering its vari­
able costs, it would continue to operate in the short-run. Should 
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Table IV-16. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of 
branch and local plant openings per year, eastern versus 
western Iowa, on the percentage change in GNP lagged 
from zero to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope . 
Lag Intercept (B) R F 
No lag in GNP 
rBranch 16.882 -.295 .060 .58 
t Local 11.977 .099 .007 .06 
„ . rBranch 8.234 .560 .149 1.58 
I Local 13.733 -.306 .056 .53 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
rBranch 15.533 .170 .019 .17 
tLocal 12.380 -.039 .001 .01 
„ rBranch 7.444 .895 .358 5.03 
Local 11.867 .346 .067 .64 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
_ rBranch 14.983 .363 .113 1.13 
I Local 12.347 -.027 .001 .01 
** * 
rBranch 7.894 .719 .300 3.85 
wsst^Local 11.607 .432 .135 1.41 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
rBranch 14.901 .341 .085 .84 
tLocal 12.056 .067 .003 .03 
"kick *** 
rBranch 6.918 .927 .433 6.90. 
WGSct Local 10.708 .654 .270 3.33 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
fBranch 14.953 .317 .044 .41 
tLocal 12.613 -.103 .005 .04 
** ** 
f Branch 6.464 1.042^ .325 4.35 
Local 10.309 .759" .216 2.48 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
** 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
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Table IV-17. Coefficients resulting from regressing the number of 
branch and local plant closings per year, eastern versus 
western Iowa, on the percentage change in GNP lagged 
from zero to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Slope 2 
Lag Intercept (3) R F 
No lag in GNP 
• Branch 
East { 
West { 
Local 
Branch 
Local 
4.936 
2.843 
3.823 
1.778 
.222 
.053 
i 
.396 
.013 
.** 
.102 
.007 
.349 
.001 
1 .02  
.06 
4.82* 
. 01  
** 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
4.964 
2.671 
3.915 
2.504 
-.251 
.120 
-.464 
-.249 
*** 
** 
.125 
.035 
.450 
.347 
1 .26  
.32 
7.35 
4.76 
.*** 
** 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
îLTaf 
4.820 
2.747 
3.606 
2.525 
-.195 
.090 
-.346 
-.252 
.** 
*** 
,096 
.026 
.324 
.459 
,96 
.23 
4.30 
7.66 
*** 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
East 
Local 
West 
Local 
5.071 
2.339 
3.507 
2.781 
-.247 
.205 
-.270' 
-.298 
***** 
.136 
.113 
.171 
.561 
1.40 
1.15 
1 . 8 6  
11.46 
***** 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
rBranch 
East { 
West {. 
Local 
Branch 
Local 
5.456 
2.084 
3.655 
3.195 
-.358 
.277 
.308, 
-.416' 
. 168  
. 122  
.133 
.648 
1 . 8 1  
1 . 2 6  
1.38, 
16 .61"  
k 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
***** 
Significant at the .5 percent level. 
Table IV-18. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of branch and local 
plant closings per year, western Iowa, on the percentage change in GNP lagged from 
zero to six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept of X of o 
Lag (Bg) (Bi) (Bg) R 
No lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
3.611 
1.864 
-.495 
.053 
** 
,026 
.010 
3.75 
.013 
2.40 
.05 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
4.151 
1.978 
-.386 
-.422 
*** 
-.026, 
.052 
.461 
.513 
3.42 
4.21' 
** 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
3.811 
2.137 
-.309 
-.322 
***** 
-.015, 
.028 
.337 
.587 
2.03 
5.69 
*** 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
3.657 
2.532 
-.200 
.414 
***** 
,017 
,029 
.185 
. 612  
.91 
6.31 
*** 
Six Quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
3.924 
3.128 
.024 
-.499 
*** 
.078 
,019 
. 181  
.658 
.88 
7.70 
**** 
* 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
**** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. 
***** 
Significant at the .5 percent level. 
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the recession persist or be severe, the indigenous firm would also 
eventually cease production. Therefore, the fact that western branch 
plant's exhibited a higher marginal propensity to close for the 
shortest lags (zero, two, and three quarters), and western local firms 
had higher slope coefficients for the four and six quarter lags and 
an accelerator effect is not inconsistent with the previous theory. 
Branch plants were still contributing a procyclical factor to the 
region's economy by terminating production at the onset of the reces­
sion. 
The migration of plants into western Iowa in response to positive 
percentage changes in aggregate demand occurred only after a fairly 
long lag. Both unit and branch plant openings responded best to the 
four quarter lag in GNF. The theory in Chapter II hypothesized that 
the primary influx of new industry into western Iowa would occur only 
after labor and production facilities had become scarce in the in­
dustrial centers. The above lags tend to support such a hypothesis. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Local development organizations are very interested in obtaining 
new industry for their communities. Such a concern is understandable 
because the existence of a healthy industrial base is beneficial to 
the provision of a viable areal economy. However, since all firms do 
not exhibit the same degree of locational stability, the characteristics 
of the community's manufacturers will influence its ability to maintain 
or expand the existing industrial base. According to Isard, 
The percent of a regions activities in durables, the 
presence of growth industries in its industrial mix, 
the diversity of its industrial structure, the sensi­
tivity of each of its individual production lines, 
the direction and rate of change of its underlying 
secular position are all factors to be considered in 
the formulation of policy for the region and in the 
programming of its development [22, p. 188]. 
The results of this study indicate that the ownership mix of a region's 
industry should also be included with the above factors. 
Plant ownership characteristics will affect a firm's migration 
rate and its ability to survive adverse changes in demand, i.e., its 
locational stability. Unit concerns have experienced the highest fail­
ure rate, possibly due to the fact that they cannot close branches and 
maintain production efficiency in the remaining facilities when demand 
falls. In spite of this high propensity for bankruptcy, the locational 
instability of branch plants significantly exceeded that of local firms; 
and this differential existed regardless of the plant location, product 
mix, or plant size. However, among the branches, those producing 
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durable goods were the least stable. The branch plants relatively 
high degree of instability was primarily due to outmigration and not 
failure. This high outmigration rate resulting from the multi-plant 
companies' inclination to consolidate production into fewer facilities 
when demand falls, and the relative unimportance of locational in­
ertia. 
Branch plant migration was also more responsive to fluctuations 
in the national business cycles than that of local firms. Branches 
had exhibited a propensity for opening during prosperous periods and 
closing during recession. Such a migration pattern, which was even 
more pronounced if the branch plants were producing durable goods or 
located in the western half of Iowa, contributed a procyclical factor 
to the region's economy. 
Local plants producing durable and nondurable goods reacted 
similarly to cyclical variations in aggregate demand. In both cases, 
plant openings and closings were unresponsive to percentage changes 
in GNP. Only the local manufacturers of western Iowa displayed any 
response to the business cycle; however, a relatively long lag (four 
to six quarters) existed between prosperity and openings, and reces^ 
sion and closings. 
The cyclical plant migrations that occurred during the period 
under study were primarily concentrated in western Iowa. The pattern 
of branch plant migration for the western half of the state; a short 
lag (two quarters) between declines in GNP and closings, and a 
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relatively long lag (four quarters) between prosperity and plant 
openings, was consistent with the previous theory concerning the tim­
ing of cyclical plant openings and closings for "geographically periph­
eral" regions. Western local plant openings responded to changes in 
aggregate demand in a manner similar to that generally displayed by 
branch plants, i.e., local firm inmigration was most prevelant four 
quarters after an increase in GNP. However, unit closings occurred 
approximately a year after the branches had outmigrated. Since branches 
are outmigrating soon after the national recession begins, and local 
plants are closing much later in the recession stage; plant closings 
may contribute to further employment declines in the region during a 
national recession and retard employment gains if recovery closely fol­
lows the decline in demand. The long lags between increases in GNP and 
branch and local plant openings also infers that the cyclical benefits 
accruing to western Iowa as a result of national propserity will be 
realized late in the recovery stage. Therefore, plant openings and 
closings will lengthen and deepen the recession and shorten the recovery 
and prosperity stages of rural regions relatively isolated from popula­
tion and industrial centers. However, if national prosperity can be 
sustained for a relatively long period, these "geographically peripher­
al" regions will experience a large influx of new industry and a highly 
prosperous economy. In summary, Figure V-1 graphically presents the 
cyclical fluctuation of a peripheral region that would result from plant 
migrations. Unfortunately, little can be done by local leaders to alter 
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$ Region 
Nation 
time 
Figure V-1. Hypothetical regional and national business cycles. 
these procyclical plant migration patterns. Those rural regions on 
the fringe must accept a share of the national business cycle through 
cyclical plant openings and closings. Perhaps by understanding that 
variations are likely, they can adjust and prepare for them as best 
they can. 
Finally, the location stability of manufacturing plants appears 
to be affected by ownership changes as well as the original ownership 
characteristies. Plants acquired through horizontal, market extension» 
and product extension mergers exhibited an outmigration rate far in 
excess of even the highly mobile branch plants' migration rates. How­
ever, in spite of the high probability of a community losing one of 
its manufacturers as a result of a merger, an acquisition initiated to 
insure a market of sufficient size to support efficient production 
should not be discouraged. The merger allowed the formation of one 
efficient operation out of two or more inefficient plants. Without 
the acquisitions, both firms may have failed; whereas the merger may 
increase the locational stability of the augmented operation. This 
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benefit will not accrue from acquisitions undertaken solely to in­
crease monopoly power. 
In conclusion, rural communities must expect occasional plant 
outmigration and failures. The probability of losing a company is 
high (approximately 15 percent of rural Iowa's industrial base closed 
during the last 10 years), and the impact on the local economy can be 
serious. In general it seems the chance of plant loss increases with 
the concentration of branch plants relative to local firms in the in­
dustrial base and the number of operating firms merging with "outside" 
concerns. 
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VII. APPENDIX A: TABLES 
Table A-1, The characteristics of Iowa plants which have outmigrated or ceased production, 1965-
1975 
Company 
Previous 
Iowa 
location 
Ownership 
charac­
teristics 
Headquarters 
(if not local) 
Estimated 
peak 
employment 
Year 
production 
ceased or 
transferred 
Principal 
products 
1. Honeggers 
2. Kayot Inc. 
3. Rob Ross 
Farms, Inc. 
4. Kalonial 
Industries, 
Inc. 
Indianola Branch 
plant 
Fairbury, 
Illinois 
30 1970 Hog and 
cattle 
feed 
Reason; The Indianola plant suffered fire damage in 1970. The parent company 
elected to transfer production to the other branches instead of rebuild­
ing the facility. 
Indianola Branch 
plant 
Mankato, 
Minnesota 
250 1974 Motor 
homes 
Reason: Due to excesis production capacity, resulting from a decline in demand 
for mobile homes, the parent company decided to consolidate production 
in the other branches (Forest City, Iowa and Mankato, Minnesota). 
Kingsley Local 
Reason: Bankrupt. 
Kalona Local 
50 
(seasonal) 
50 
1975 
1974 
Pickled 
com 
Mobile 
homes 
Reas on î Bankrup t. 
5. Chef-Qulk Kalona Local — 120 1972 Pre-cooked 
meats 
Reason: The company's plant was damaged by fire, and it couldn't be repaired 
fast enough tO' keep their customers from turning to their competitors. 
6. Mid-States 
Packing 
Hawarden Branch 
plant 
Sioux City, 
Iowa 
45 1970 Meat 
packing 
Reason: The Hawarden facility was only in operation 8 to 9 months before the 
parent company found itself in financial difficulty. This branch was 
closed 3 to 4 months prior to Mid-States declaring bankruptcy. 
7. Victor-Metal 
Products 
Corp. 
Iowa City Branch 
plant 
Newport, 
Arkansas 
100 1975 Metal 
tubes 
Reason; Due to a decline in their sales of metal tubes, production was con­
solidated in the company's Cincinnati, Ohio branch. 
o 
8. Glenwood 
Packing 
9. Fryer Farms, 
Inc. 
Glenwood Local 300 1968 Meat 
packing 
Reason: Glenwood purchased the eld Roth facility in 1965 or 1966. They went 
bankrupt two years later. 
Forest City Local 70 1964 Chicken 
processing 
Reason: The company moved to Forest City from Mason City in 1962. Bankruptcy 
resulted from the shift of the broiler industry to the South. 
10. Wadco Foods Estherville Branch 
plant 
Estherville, 
Iowa (now 
Lakeland, 
Florida) 
450 1974 Chicken 
processing 
Reason: The company was not satisfied with Estherville because of labor shortages 
and union difficulties. The community thought that Wadco was creating a 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Year 
Previous Ownership Estimated production 
Iowa charac- Headquarters peak ceased or Principal 
Company location teristics (if not local) employment transferred products 
pollution problem and wanted them to abandon their downtown location 
However, the firm didn't think Estherville was being helpful in finding 
a new site. Wlien some contracts with the government expired, they 
elected to transfer their entire operation (including headquarters) to 
Florida. 
11. Ajax Manu­
facturing 
Company 
12. American 
Paper Prod­
ucts, Inc. 
Ft. Madison Branch 
plant 
(Merger-1) 
Compton Plaines, 
New Jersey 
Reason : 
200 1971 Fences, 
trailers, 
metal lawn 
and garden 
buildings 
Arrow Group (a subsidiary of Chromalloy American Corporation from St. 
Louis) purchased Ajax in 1970 from Montgomery Wards. In 1971 the product 
line was transferred to two other Arrow plants (Harvard and Breese, 
Illinois) after the production capacity of the Breese facility had been 
augmented. The production of these products was later discontinued. 
Ft. Madison Branch 
plant 
Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania 
100 1973 Ammunition 
tubes 
Reason: The Ft. Madison facility was supplying ammunition tubes to the Burlington 
ordinance plant. Demand fell after the Vietman War ended; therefore, 
production was consolidated in American's Ohio plant. 
13. Nodaway Corning Branch Morristown, 130 1972 Septic 
Valley Foods plant New Jersey canners 
(Merger-9) 
Reason: Allied Chemicals purchased Nodaway in 1963 when the company was inter­
ested in diversification. Later new management in AC decided to con­
centrate their efforts in areas related to chemicals and energy. Nodaway 
was not profitable, and was one of a number of their companies that was 
subsequently «old. The equipment was moved to Australia by the new 
owners. 
14. Cherokee 
Bottling Co. 
15. William's 
Industrial 
Corporation 
16. Purolator 
Filter 
17. Whatoff Co. 
(Trailer 
Totter) 
Cherokee Lo cal 20 1970 Soft 
drinks 
Reason: The owner died and the company that acquired the Cherokee market is 
located in another community. 
Cherokee Local 20 1972 
Reason : Bankrupt. 
Creston 
Reason: 
Ames 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Rahway, 
New Jersey 
175 1975 
Pickup 
campers 
Air, fuel, 
and oil 
filters 
Purolator started production in Iowa in 1964. The company considered 
labor costs to be too high, therefore, they transferred production to 
their other plants (New Jersey and Georgia). 
Local 120 1974 Modified 
trucks 
Whatoff, a local concern for almost 25 years, altered trucks for the 
purpose of hauling mobile homes. The company failed when mobile home 
sales declined in 1974. 
o kO 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Year 
Previous Ownership Estimated production 
Iowa charac- Headquarters peak ceased or Principal 
Company location teristics (if not local) employment transferred products 
18. Donaldson's Ames 
Reason: 
Local — 45 1973 Bicycles 
and rec­
reation 
vehicles 
The owner had a dispute with the City Council over a proposed highway 
development. He moved his production to Tyler, Texas. 
19. Belmond 
Homes 
Belmond 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Prairie Du 
Chien, Wisconsin 
35 1974 Mobile 
homes 
A decline in mobile home sales had resulted in excess plant capacity at 
both Belmond and the headquarters. When the Iowa law regulating the 
hauling of mobile homes was revised to allow longer trips, production 
was consolidated in Prairie Du Chien. 
20. Advance Ross 
Electronics 
Corporation 
Burlington Branch 
plant 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
380 1968 Electric 
compres­
sors and 
coils 
Reason: Advanced Ross had purchased the Burlington facility in 1959. They also 
had a branch in Washington, Iowa; and when sales fell they consolidated 
production at the larger and newer plant (Washington). 
21. Campbell 
Chain Co. 
22.  
23. Sylvania 
Electric 
Products Inc. 
24. DeJon 
Company 
25. Atomic 
Energy 
Commission 
West Branch 
Burlington plant 
York, 
Pennsylvania 
150 1971 Automo­
bile 
chains 
Reason: The company complained that there didn't exist sufficient room to expand 
at their Iowa location. They built a new plant in California and 
elected to transfer production there. 
Electric 
Design and 
Manufacturing 
Company 
Burlington Local 
Reason; 
— 50 1966 Instru­
ments to 
measure 
electrical 
current 
The Individual who was both o%mer and president died, and the business 
failed. 
Burlington Branch 
plant 
New York, 
New York 
650 1969 TV and 
radio 
tubes 
Reason: The Burlington plant, which started production in 1954, was providing 
tubes for Sylvania's TVs and radios. When the industry went to transis­
tors, the product and facility were no longer needed. 
Burlington Local — 25 1972 
Reason; The company went bankrupt after about 6 years of operation. 
Burlington Branch 
plant 
Washington, 
D.C. 
7,000 1975 
TV 
antennas 
Munitions 
for the 
U.S. Army 
Reason : Production at the Burlington facility had been phased out and transferred 
to Armarillo, Texas as a result of peace in Vietnam. At the time of its 
closing, the facility was employing approximately 1,100 individuals. 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Year 
Previous Ownership Estimated production 
Iowa charac- Headquarters peak ceased or Principal 
Company location teristics (if not local) employment transferred products 
26. Selby Food Burlington Branch 
Company, Inc. plant 
Ft. Wayne, 
Indiana 
25-100 
(seasonal) 
1974 Frozen 
turkeys 
an3 
chickens 
Reason: Selby Foods was purchased by Central Soya in the mid-1950's. The plant 
was closed because Central Soya didn't consider it worth the time, ef­
fort, or money to make the alterations necessary to conform to OSHA 
standards. 
27. Embalming 
Burial Case 
Company 
Burlington 
28. Compact 
' Industries 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-1) 
Des Moines, 
Iowa 
30 1973 Caskets 
Reason: Embalming Burial Case was originally a local firm which had been in 
business for nearly 100 years. In the I960's it became a division of 
Murry Iran Works. Trane purchased Hurry in 1972 but they were not in­
terested in the casket company. EBC was sold to Iowa Casket Company of 
Des Moines in 1972, and production was transferred to Des Moines in 1973. 
Lake Mills Local 55 1967 Coffee 
machines 
Reason: The company was owned by individuals from Boston and Chicago. The 
Chicago stockholders acquired controlling interests in the firm and 
moved production to Chicago. 
29. Snowden, 
Inc. 
Knoxville Branch 
plant 
Osceola, 
Iowa 
20 1969 Ladies 
lingerie 
and sleep-
wear 
Reason: A decline in sales of the company's products encouraged the consolidation 
of production at the firm's Osceola plant. Knoxville and Osceola are 
approximately 50 miles apart. 
30. Continental Knoxville Branch 
Manufacturing plant 
Company (Merger-0) 
Reason: 
Carthage, 
Missouri 
200 1969 Mens work 
clothing 
Big Smith, Inc. purchased Continental in 1969 because they needed extra 
capacity for the production of style goods. Continental's Oskaloosa 
plant provided sufficient additional capacity, therefore, the Knoxville 
vacility was closed immediately after the acquisition. 
31. Adel Clay 
Products 
Inc. 
Centerville Branch 
plant 
West Des Moines, 
Iowa 
35 1966 Clay 
bricks and 
blocks 
32. George P. 
Smith 
Company 
Reason: 
Charles 
City 
Reason : 
Adel acquired Centerville Firebrick in 1955. The facility was closed in 
1966 because it was antiquated and inefficient. 
Local 50 1968 Windows 
and 
fixtures 
The plant was destroyed by tornadoes in 1968. The owners decided to 
pocket the insurance money instead of rebuilding. About 50 percent of 
the owners resided outside of Charles City. 
33. Hoag Duster 
Company 
Monticello Local 20 1972 Feather 
dusters 
Reason; Hoag Duster had been in business for almost 100 years. Sales fell to 
such an extent that the family chose to dissolve the company and auction 
off the equipment and buildings. 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Year 
Previous Ownership Estimated production 
Iowa charac- Headquarters peak ceased or Principal 
Company location teristics (if not local) employment transferred products 
34. Marlboro 
Plastics 
(Style Pak, 
Inc. ) 
35. Kaul Glove 
Company 
36. Manchester 
Industries, 
Inc. 
37. Emerson 
Electric 
Company 
Newton Local 25 1972 Plastic 
goods 
Reason; Marlboro started production in 1967. They declared bankruptcy in 1972. 
New London Branch 
plant 
Detroit, 
Michigan 
75 1973 Industrial 
work 
gloves 
Reason: Kaul Glove had three branch plants (Ohio, Michigan, and Iowa). The 
company wanted to expand and elected to move operations to Tennessee to 
take advantage of lower wages. Production from the Iowa facility was 
transferred to the new plant. 
Manchester Local 40 1969 Plywood 
and 
veneers 
Reason: The hometown owner wanted to try another line of work. He sold the 
Manchester facility to a fiberglass company and moved to Arkansas. 
Mount 
Pleasant 
Branch 
plant 
St. Louis, 
Missouri 
385 1970 Electrical 
components 
Reason: The Emerson Company relied heavily on government contracts and the 
aerospace program. When these contracts were terminated, they consoli­
dated production in their other plants (St. Louis). 
38. Superior 
Continental 
Corporation 
Mount 
Pleasant 
Reason: 
Branch 
plant 
Hickory, 
North Carolina 
105 1975 TV cables 
Superior had four branch plants in 1975. When sales for their product 
declined, they decided to consolidate production in fewer plants. 
39. Silent Sioux Orange City Branch St. Paul, 
Corporation plant Minnesota 
(Merger-1) 
100 1973 Fabricated 
sheet met­
al prod­
ucts 
Reason: The Silent Sioux Corporation was originally locally owned. In 1972 the 
owner and owmer's son died and the company was acquired (by sale of 
stock) by Metal Engineering Corporation out of St. Paul. Silent Sioux 
was highly liquid and had large cash reserves. The community believes 
MEC drained the company of its assets and forced it into bankruptcy. 
40. Evangel 
Aircraft 
Orange City Local 25 1975 Bush air­
craft for 
South 
America 
Reason: The company had problems with marketing the product and collecting on 
delivered goods. They dissolved the operation in 1975 after eight years 
of business in Iowa. 
41. Otis Radio 
and Electric 
Corporation 
Orange City Branch 
plant 
Gary, 
Illinois 
45 1973 Electrical 
components 
Reason: Otis had branches in Orange City and Hawarden, Iowa, and Canton, South 
Dakota. Both the Orange City and Canton facilities were leased. Be­
cause of competition from abroad, these leased plants were closed and 
production was moved to Mexico. 
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42. Randolph 
Foods, Inc. 
Guthrie 
Center 
Reason: 
A3. North Ameri- Manson 
can Golf 
Corporation 
Reason: 
44. Lawhorn, 
Inc. 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-0) 
Topeka, 
Kansas 
400 1965 Egg proc­
essing and 
butter 
Randolph Foods was originally an Iowa company with its headquarters at 
Guthrie Center and branches in Des Moines, Marshalltown, Sac City, Lenox, 
Carroll, Boone and Harlan. Randolph was sold to Seymour Foods of Topeka, 
Kansas in 1965. Seymour closed all the plants except Sac City in order 
to concentrate production in the South. 
Local 50 1975 Golf bags 
This company was only producing for a short time before it declared 
bankruptcy. 
Bellevue Branch 
plant 
Cedar Rapids, 
Iowa 
85 1975 Wheel bal­
ancers , 
auto 
hoists, 
and align­
ment equip. 
Lawhorn, which had plants in Bellevue and Rock Island, Illinois, was 
acquired by Quik-Way Industries of Cedar Rapids in 1973 in order to di­
versify their line of auto repair products. After Quik-Way lost its con­
tracts with John Deere, production was consolidated in the Rock Island 
facility. 
45. Funk Seeds 
Interna­
tional , Inc. 
Belle 
Plaine 
Reason: 
Branch 
plant 
Bloomington, 
Illinois 
20-100 
(seasonal) 
1969 Hybrid 
seeds 
Funk Seeds wanted to transfer all their production to Bloomington, but 
the Belle Plaine manager (Lewis Falck) convinced them to keep the 
facility open. In 1968 Funk Seeds was acquired by Corn Products Corpora­
tion of Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. When Falck retired they were ready 
to consolidate production at the headquarters. 
46. Mull Food 
Services 
Muscatine 
Reason: 
47. Audubon Audubon 
Manufacturing 
Company 
Reason: 
Local — 50 1974 Food mar­
keting and 
warehous­
ing 
Null was marketing and warehousing for small independent grocerers. The 
recession and competition from the chain grocery stores forced them out 
of business. 
Branch 
plant 
Milford, 
Iowa 
20 1970 Chairs and 
uphol­
stered 
furniture 
The Audubon Chair Company was originally a local concern. In 1969 it 
was acquired by Style-Craft Furniture of Milford, Iowa. A year later the 
Audubon branch was closed in order to consolidate production at a new, 
larger facility in Milford. 
48. American 
Button 
Company 
Muscatine Local 500 1965 Buttons 
Reason: American was a family owned and operated concern. They did not keep 
abreast of the new button making methods and subsequently went bankrupt. 
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49. Hawkeye Muscatine Local — 75 1965 Buttons 
Pearl Button 
Company 
Reason; Hawkeye was no longer competitive for the same reasons as American 
Button. They liquidated their assets and closed down. 
50. Ronda Button Muscatine Local — 50 1965 Buttons 
Company 
Reason: Ronda had problems similar to those of American and Hawkeye. They also 
declared bankruptcy. 
51. G. E. Richard Muscatine Local — 50 1972 Meat 
and Sons, packing 
Inc. 
Reasons: The company decided to close its plant because it could not afford to 
meet the USDA regulations. 
52. Curtis Clinton Local — 750 1965 Woodwork-
Company, Inc. ing and 
windows 
Reason: Curtis was quite prosperous during the 1950's but their technology and 
products became outmoded. They declared bankruptcy in 1965. 
53. Inland 
Homes 
Clinton 
Reason: 
55. Huiskamp 
Brothers 
56. Swift and 
Company 
Keokuk 
Reason: 
Keokuk 
Reason : 
57. Air Reduc- Keokuk 
tion Chemical 
and Carbide 
Company 
Reason: 
Branch 
plant 
Piqua, 
Iowa 
75 1964 Pre-fabri-
cated 
homes 
Inland closed the Clinton branch in an effort to consolidate it produc­
tion. 
54. Pennsylvania Clinton 
Tire Company 
Reason; 
Branch 
plant 
Mansfield, 
Ohio 
40 1968 Tread rub­
ber for 
retreading 
tires 
The equipment at the Clinton plant was antiquated, and Pennsylvania Tire 
considered it too costly to update. Branches in Pennsylvania and Georgia 
were expended just enough to assume the additional production. 
Local 65 1965 Shoes 
Huiskamp failed to remain competitive with the larger show companies. 
They elected to cease production and sell their supplies and machinery. 
Branch 
plant 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
100 1973 Turkey 
processing 
The Keokuk facility was old and poorly located with respect to its sup­
pliers. Maintenance, transport, and overhead costs (it was only open 
six months a year) were high, so the plant was closed and production 
transferred elsewhere. 
Branch 
plant 
New York, 
New York 
70 1965 Calcium 
carbide 
The plant wets closed because (1) it was old and obsolete and too expen­
sive to convert to an effecient operation, and (2) the demand for calcium 
carbide had fallen. 
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58. Sethness 
Products 
59. Triggs Perry 
Manufacturing 
Reason : 
60. Kohout Cap 
Company 
Keokuk Local — 20 1966 Corn 
starch 
deriva­
tives 
Reason: Sethness moved their production out of Keokuk because the company lost 
its working relationship with its supplier (Keokuk Corn Starch Company). 
Local — 20 1965 Farm wag­
ons, ,stock 
trailers, 
front-end 
loaders 
The company did not think that the community and bankers were concerned 
with the well-being of local industry. After the owner died, the son 
moved the company to Belmond, Iowa. Belmond is about 85 miles from 
Perry. 
LeMars Local — 30 1970 Hats and 
caps 
Reason: Kohout was a family-owned corporation. When the president died, the son 
moved the company to Orange City, Iowa. The president simply felt that 
this would be a more successful location. Orange City is about 70 miles 
from LeMars. 
61. New Clarion Clarion Branch Tripoli, 50 1965 Poultry 
Produce plant Iowa processing 
Reason: New Clarion was a subsidiary of Kramer-Crittenden Produce. After the 
broiler industry moved South, Kramer-Crittenden went bankrupt. 
62. Clarkbuilt CIarinda 
Reason: 
63. Ocoma Foods Carroll 
Reason : 
64. Electronetics Carroll 
Reason : 
Local 110 1975 Modular 
homes 
Clarkbuilt moved to Clarinda in 1974 from Kansas City, Missouri. "Poor 
management" forced them to liquidate their operation one year later. 
Branch 
plant 
Omaha, 
Nebraska 
80 1970 Turkey and 
chicken 
processing 
Two factors contributed to the closing of the Carroll plant: (1) the 
facility was old and inefficient; (2) Ocoma Foods elected to abandon 
their poultry lines because their suppliers had moved out of the area. 
Branch 
plant 
Martin Grove, 
Illinois 
175 
(proposed) 
1970 Movie 
screens 
Electronetics opened the Carroll facility the same year it closed. A 
truckers' strike, which lasted months, prevented the company from ship­
ping its product to the parent plant in Illinois and forced it into 
bankruptcy. 
65. Hyland Carlisle 
Manufacturing 
Company 
Reason : 
Local — 70 1973 Fifth 
wheel 
travel 
trailers 
Hyland wanted to expand their operation but they couldn't find an adequate 
site in Carlisle. Subsequently, they transferred production 45 miles 
away to Osceola, Iowa. 
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66. Carlisle 
Brickyard 
67. American 
Agricultural 
and Chemical 
Company 
(Agrico) 
Carlisle Local 20 
Reason: The owner retired and closed the company. 
Humboldt 
68. Collins 
Radio 
Company 
69. Anamosa 
Concrete 
Products 
Reason: 
Anamosa 
Reason: 
Anamosa 
Branch 
plant 
Tulsa, 
Oklahoma 
50 
1972 
1972 
Bricks and 
blocks 
Chemically 
processed 
ferti­
lizers 
The chemically processed fertilizers could no longer compete with the 
blended fertilizers, therefore, Agrico eliminated this good from their 
product line. The Humboldt plant, which was built in 1952, was also 
polluting the surrounding area. 
Branch 
plant 
Dallas, 
Texas 
250 1971 Transis­
tors 
The Anamosa facility was not efficient (overloaded with personnel) be­
cause of too m.iny years of U.S. government cost-plus contracts. The 
company elected to resolve the problem by phasing out the Anamosa opera­
tion and transferring production to the Cedar Rapids plant. 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-1) 
Wayzata, 
Minnesota 
20 1973 Silo 
staves and 
doors, 
concrete 
products 
Reason: The Van Dale Corporation purchased Anamosa Concrete in 1972 and moved 
production to Maquoketa, Iowa one year later. Proximity to raw materials 
and fewer market area conflicts were mentioned as justifications for the 
move. Maquoketa is 34 miles from Anamosa. 
70. Wilson and 
Company 
Eagle 
Grove 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Oklahoma City 
Oklahoma 
120 1970 Pre-cooked 
frozen 
dinners 
The Eagle Grove facility was destroyed by fire in 1970. The frozen foods 
industry was overexpanded at the time so production was transferred to 
under-utilized plants instead of rebuilding in Eagle Grove. 
71. Selected 
Casings 
Inc. 
72. Machine 
Products 
Inc. 
Odebolt 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
San Antonio, 
Texas (later 
Sacremento, 
California) 
2 1  1974 Sausage 
casings 
Selected Casings, a subsidiary of A. Dewied Casing Company, was creating 
a pollution problem in Odebolt. The community asked them to either im­
prove their waste disposal methods or leave. Selected decided to move 
all their equipment back into their suppliers' packing plants and 
slaughter houses (Iowa Falls, Denison, Sioux City). 
Corydon 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Kansas City, 
Missouri 
70 1971 Camping 
trailers 
Machine Products moved to Corydon from Des Moines in order to take ad­
vantage of lower taxes. Poor management at the Corydon plant forced the 
temporary abandonment of this product line. Later, camping trailers 
were again produced by Machine Products but this time in Kansas City. 
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73. The Coats 
Company 
Fort Dodge Branch 
plant 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
200 1974 Tire 
changing 
equipment 
Reason: The Coats Company, originally a local concern, was acquired by Hennessy 
Industries in J1962. The firm was dissatisfied with Fort Dodge for two 
reasons: (1) t:hey had problems with the union representing their labor 
force; and (2) they wanted to expand their operation but could not find 
an adequate sitie in Fort Dodge. Hennessy moved their Coats Division to 
Nashville, Tennessee in 1974. 
74. Gus Glaser 
Meats, Inc. 
Fort Dodge Local 250 1973 Meat proc­
essing, 
luncheon 
meats 
Reason: Gus Glaser MeaUs was a locally owned, family concern started in 1935. 
When the owner was ready to retire, he sold the business to a group of 
individuals from Minnesota. The new owners managed the company poorly 
and it went bankrupt. 
75. Pan-0-
Gold 
76. Bulk-Pak 
Inc. 
Fort Dodge Minneapolis, 
Minnesota 
Branch 
plant 
Reason: The parent company went bankrupt. 
Fort Dodge Local — 
100 
40 
1970 
1975 
Bakery 
goods 
Paper con­
tainers 
Reason: Bankrupt. 
77. Sargent 
Engineering 
Fort Dodge Branch 
plant 
(Merger-3) 
Cleveland, 
Ohio 
70 1970 Cranes 
Reason: Sargent, originally a subsidiary of McNally Machinery and Supply Corpora­
tion, was purchased by Warner-Swasey in 1967. The recession in 1969-
1970, and the subsequent decline in construction activity, resulted in 
excess plant capacity at Wamer-Swasey' s Winona, Minnesota and Fort Dodge 
facilities. Production was consolidated at the larger of the two plants 
(Winona). 
78. Vincent 
Clay 
Products 
Fort Dodge Local 55 1972 Clay 
bricks and 
tile 
Reason; Vincent Clay vras a family-owned corporation started in about 1910. Four 
factors contributed to its closing; (1) the plant was old and obsolete; 
(2) the surviving relatives were not interested in running the company; 
(3) the company had difficulty in attracting labor; and (4) rail service 
to the facility was terminated. 
79. 
80. 
Kalo Brick 
and Tile 
Company 
Johnston 
Block 
Company 
Fort Dodge Local 55 1971 Clay 
bricks and 
tile 
Reason: Kalo had essentially the same problems as Vincent Clay Products (#78). 
Fort Dodge Branch 
plant 
(Merger-0) 
Des Moines, 
Iowa 
50 1969 Concrete 
products 
Reason: The Goodwin Company purchased Johnston in 1956, and in 1969 Goodwin was 
acquired by Cantex Corporation of Des Moines. The Fort Dodge facility 
was obsolete and did not comply with OSHA standards. Production was 
transferred to a new plant in Redfield, Iowa. 
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81. Allied Fort Dodge Branch Chicago, 90 1975 Farm 
Products plant Illinois Implements 
Corporation 
Reason: Allied moved their Kraus line to Fort Dodge in 1974. At about the same 
time they purchased a Jerseyville, Illinois company which produced a 
similar product. Allied had overestimated the demand for these goods, 
and as a result:, both facilities were operating well below capacity. In 
1975 production was consolidated at the Jerseyville plant. 
82. AVCO-New Fort Dodge Branch Coldwater, 450 1971 Farm 
Idea plant Ohio implements 
Reason: A recession in the farm equipment market, and the resulting excess plant 
capacity, lead to consolidation at the headquarter's plant. Also, the 
Paul Revere Corporation had just obtained controlling interest in AVCO, 
and they were more Interested in financial investments than manufactur­
ing. Paul Revere wanted to sell New Idea, and they thought it would be 
easier to unload if it only consisted of one plant. 
83. Elsheimer West Union Local — 60 1974 Meat 
Meat Products processing 
Reason: Elsheimer was a family-owned corporation which started production in the 
early 1940's. Their closure was the result of managerial problems, un­
dercapitalization, and inability to conform to USDA standards. 
84. Coltra, 
Inc. 
Waverly 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-3) 
Manheim, 
Pennsy1vanla 
20 1974 Decorated 
glassware 
Coltra, a locally owned company which was founded in 1969, was purchased 
by the Rimar Company of Pennsylvania in 1971. Poor sales resulted in 
the termination of this product line and the closing of the Waverly 
plant. 
85. Advance Ross Washington Branch 
Electronics plant 
Corporation 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
400 1970 TV com­
ponents 
Reason: 
86. Hayword Tama 
Manufacturing 
Company 
87. Nivco 
Company 
Reason: 
Vinton 
Reason : 
88. Sumner 
Packing 
Company, Inc. 
Sumner 
Reason : 
During the 1965-66 color TV boom. Advance Ross opened its Washington, 
Iowa facility. In 1970, production was moved to Mexico in order to 
compete with the Japanese Imports. Advance Ross later stopped producing 
these goods entirely. 
Local 40 1969 
Hayword went bankrupt after 10 years of operation. 
Local 20 1975 
Aluminum 
windows 
and doors 
Metal lock 
boxes for 
banks 
to 
00 
Nivco started in 1969 as an offshoot of ACRO Manufacturing of Cedar 
Rapids. All products were sold to the LeFebure Corporation of Cedar 
Rapids. ^•Jhen LeFebure refused to renew their contract with Nivco, the 
company was forced out of business. 
Local 30 1974 Separating 
and freez­
ing eggs 
Sumner's plant was destroyed by fire in 1974. 
rebuild it because they were near retirement. 
The oimers elected not to 
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89. Marshalltown 
Foundry 
Company 
90. Kummeth 
Wood Prod­
ucts, Inc. 
91. Cont in en tal 
Sales 
Company 
Marshall- Branch St. Louis, 130 1973 Low tensil 
town plant Missouri iron 
(Merger-
Reason: Marshalltown Foundry was started in 1904 as a division of Lenox Indus­
tries, and in 1942 it became a separate corporation. In 1971, after a 
series of union contract disputes, it was sold to Grey Iron Foundry of 
St. Louis. Another bitter labor strike occurred in 1972-73, and as a 
result. Grey Iron decided to close the plant and transfer the production 
to its other foundries.. 
New Hampton Branch 
plant 
Owatonna, 
Minnesota 
45 1968 Baby 
furniture 
Reason: The parent company elected to eliminate this product from their line of 
goods. Kuiraniîth had been in New Hampton for only three years. 
Nevada Local — 120 1969 Fertilizer 
plants, 
bins 
mixtures 
Reason: Continental had a factory in Nevada and 65 small branches for the con­
struction of fertilizer plants. The owner had difficulty managing such 
a diffused operation, and as a result, the company failed. 
92. Acme Brass 
Foundry 
Company 
93. Comfort, 
Inc. 
94. Long-Airdox 
Company 
95. Standrad 
Kollsman 
Industries 
Ottumwa 
Reason: 
Ottumwa 
Local 85 1966 
Ottumwa 
Reason : 
Brass 
fittings, 
etc. 
Reason : 
Ottumwa 
Reason: 
Acme had been in operation 25 years when the owner became ill and de­
cided to close the company. 
Branch Pontiac, 100 1968 Over-
plant Illinois stuffed 
(Merger-?.) chairs, 
and re-
cliners 
Comfort was a locally-owned concern until acquired by Pontiac Chairs 
of Pontiac, iEllinois in 1966. After labor difficulties and a prolonged 
strike, production was consolidated in Pontiac. 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-3) 
Oak Hill, 
West Virginia 
65 1965 Coal 
mining 
equipment 
The Ottumwa plant was originally locally owned (Hardsoag Company) and 
most of theiif equipment was sold to the Iowa coal mines. Hardsoag was 
first acquired by Long-Airdox and later by the Marmon Herrington Company 
(1962). In recent years coal production in Iowa had declined, and all 
of Long-Airdox's products were being shipped East. In 1965 production 
was transferred to West Virginia to provide proximity to the coal fields. 
Branch 
plant 
Melrose, 
Illinois 
1,200 1968 TV tuners 
and com­
ponents 
All of the Standrad Kollsman branches producing TV tuners were retooled 
in preparation for producing a new product. The company could not get 
the flaws out of the new item, and subsequently, they closed all plants 
producing it. 
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96. Riverside Ottumwa 
Manufacturing 
Industries, 
Inc. 
Reason; 
Branch 
plant 
Detroit, 
Michigan 
100 1971 Wiring 
interiors 
for autos 
and trucks 
Riverside lost part of their market during the autoworkers' strike and 
decided to consolidate production. 
97. Bogdeni Otturawa 
Industries, 
Inc. 
Local 55 1974 
Reason: Bankrupt. 
98. John Morrell Ottumwa 
and Company 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
3,500 1973 
Beauty 
shop 
fixtures 
Meat 
products 
(1) The Ottumwa facility was antiquated (built in 1877) and inefficient; 
and (2) Morrell was unhappy with the union representing their Otturawa 
employees. 
99. Iowa Muffler Columbus 
Company, Junction 
Inc. 
Reason: 
Local 20 1973 Automobile 
mufflers 
The company declared bankruptcy after only two years of operation. 
100. Travelcraft 
Corporation 
Holstein Local 30 1968 Travel 
trailers 
and 
campers 
Reason; Travelcraft started production in 1966 and went bankrupt two years 
later. 
101, The Vilas 
Company 
Holstein Branch 
plant 
(Merger-0) 
Storm Lake, 
Iowa 
25 1975 Turkey 
hatchery 
and proc­
essing 
102. Iowa Lumber 
and Supply 
(Payless-
Cashway) 
Reason: In 1970 the headquarter * s plant burned down and was replaced by a much 
larger facility. Part of Holstein's production was transferred to Storm 
Lake's at this time. After the owner's death, Vilas was sold to Thompson 
Industries of Storm Lake (in 1975). Thompson did not need the Holstein 
plant because; of excess capacity at their Ellsworth facility. 
Iowa Falls Local — 50 1975 Products 
for lumber 
yards and 
hardware 
stores 
Iowa Falls was originally the national headquarters of Payless-Cashway. 
The administrative functions were moved to Denver, Colorado in order to 
take advantage of international airport facilities. 
103. Excel 
Industries 
Reason ; 
Wilton 
Reason; 
Branch 
plant 
Hesston, 
Kansas 
20 1974 Tractor 
and com­
bine cabs 
In 1969 Excel established an assembly and distribution plant in Wilton 
to supply cabs on contract to implement dealers. The contract was lost 
in 1974, and Excel discontinued their production of this item. 
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104. National 
Distillers 
Products 
Company 
105. McColloughs, 
Inc. 
106. Morton Foods 
(Division of 
I.T. and T.) 
Tipton 
Reason: 
Webster 
City 
Reason: 
Webster 
City 
Reason: 
Branch 
plant 
Memphis, 
Tennessee 
60 1970 Barrel 
staves for 
whiskey 
National constructed a very large barrel stave facility in Memphis and 
closed many of their smaller plants. Logs were to be shipped to Memphis 
by river and rail. 
Local 20 1974 Swine 
feeders 
and 
waterers 
This family-owned corporation went bankrupt after over 50 years of 
operation. 
Branch 
plant 
New York, 
New York 
900 1968 Frozen 
dinners 
and 
deserts 
In March of 1968 the U.A.W. and the Amalgamated Meatcutters (supported 
by the Teamsters) initiated a bitter strike which was to last seven 
months. Governor Rockefeller of Arkansas heard about Morton's problems 
in Webster City and offered to provide them with a free site, plant, and 
utilities if they would move their operation to Russellville, Arkansas. 
The transition was made in September of 1968. 
107. Hart-Carter Webster 
Company City 
Reason; 
108. Continental Malvern 
Egg Corpora­
tion (Divi­
sion of 
Henningson 
Foods) 
Reason: 
109. Crownline Hamburg 
Plastics 
Company 
Reason ; 
Branch Minneapolis, 125 1971 Screens 
plant Minnesota for com­
bines and 
thrashers 
Hart-Carter had 14 plants, three of which were producing screens. New 
management took control of the company and decided to consolidate all 
screen production at the Gridley, Illinois facility. They considered 
this to be a more efficient method of production. 
Branch Omaha, 100 1975 Dried 
plant Nebraska eggs 
The Malvern plant was producing dried eggs for pet foods, but a decline 
in the supply of eggs and in the profit margins for inedible eggs 
forced them to halt production for this market. The Malvern plant was 
not used for the production of edible dried eggs because the facility 
was old (built in the early 1900's) and it would entail too great an 
investment to bring the plant up to USDA standards. Also, the demand for 
edible dried eggs (primarily used in candy) fell when England joined the 
Common Market. Because of the above factors, production was discontinued 
at Malvern. 
Local — 20 1970 Plastic 
pipe 
Crowline transferred its production 7 miles away to Nebraska City, 
Nebraska. The reasons cited for such a short move were better tax and 
transportation benefits in Nebraska. 
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110. Bonaparte 
Rendering 
Company 
Bonaparte Branch 
plant 
(Merger-1) 
Des Moines, 
Iowa 
23 1966 Hides, 
grease, 
and meat 
scraps 
Reason: Bonaparte Rendering was started in the 1930's. In 1959 the company was 
acquired by Cedar Rapids Hide and Fur, and in 1965 it was sold to National 
By-Products of Des Moines. It was operated for less than one year by 
National By-Products before they dismantled the facility and transferred 
production to their Clinton and Des Moines plants. 
111. Mid-Equip-
ment 
Corporation 
Wellsburg Local 20 1968 Truck 
hoists and 
flatbeds 
Reason: Mid-Equipment needed a larger facility and they requested that the com­
munity provide them with a new plant under a lease-purchase plan. Wells­
burg would not cooperate but Grundy Center did,so production was 
transferred to that city. Grundy Center is 15 miles from Wellsburg. 
112. Darling-
Delaware 
Company 
Alpha 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Chicago, 
Illinois 
35 1972 Animal by­
products 
The Alpha plant was old and the company considered it more practical to 
build a new facility than refurbish the one at Alpha. Tama was selected 
as the site for the new building because of greater proximity to sup­
pliers. Tama is about 100 miles from Alpha. 
113. Elgin 
Asparagus 
Corporation 
Elgin Local — 25 1967 Asparagus 
and corn 
canning 
Reason: This company started production in Elgin in 1945. High labor costs 
(they had to import Mexicans to pick the asparagus) prevented the opera­
tion from being profitable in recent years. The owners elected to 
liquidate the company's assets and close the business in 1967. 
114. Cargill, 
Inc. 
Redfield Branch 
plant 
Minneapolis, 
Minnesota 
30 1967 Soybean 
processing 
Reason: Production was transferred to Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, and Wichita, 
Kansas in order to minimize transportation costs. 
115. Oskaloosa Oskaloosa 
Clay Products 
(Goodwin 
Company) 
Reason: 
Branch 
plant 
Des Moines, 
Iowa 
25 1968 Brick and 
tile 
products 
The Oskaloosa facility was old and inefficient. Production was trans­
ferred to Ottumwa after the construction of a new plant in that communi­
ty. 
116. Herters, 
Inc. 
Iowa Falls Branch 
plant 
Waseca, 
Minnesota 
25 1975 Clay Tar­
gets for 
trap shoot 
shooting 
Reason; The parent company wanted a plant in the Southwest to serve that market 
area. Demand by Iowa consumers could be met by production at the Min­
nesota facility so the Iowa Falls plant was closed, and the equipment 
was moved to Enos, Texas. 
u> 
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117. Gilbert Iowa Falls 
Manufacturing 
and Building 
Local 20 1972 Building 
and con­
struction 
firm 
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Reason: The owner retired and liquidated the company's assets. 
118. Sturdy-
House 
Waukon 
Manufacturing 
Company 
Reason: 
119. Federated 
Industries, 
Inc. 
Waukon 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
Flagler Beach, 
Florida 
20 1974 Portable 
storage 
buildings 
Sturdy-House opened their Waukon plant in 1972. Two factors lead to its 
brief existence in Iowa. (1) Waukon did not have a large enough pool of 
unemployed liibor from which to draw a work force; (2) Iowa customers were 
not interested in assembling these buildings during the winter months, 
therefore, production was transferred South where there existed a year 
round market for the product. 
Branch 
plant 
Grayslake, 
Illinois 
150 1968 Loud 
speakers 
and bat­
tery 
chargers 
The Waukon facility was opened in 1964. Federated's president stated 
that the plant was losing money because it could not get supplies from 
the other branches on schedule. Subsequently, the Waukon facility was 
closed and production was consolidated back into the headquarter's plant. 
120. The Shannon Bancroft Local 
Company 
30 1971 Furniture 
Reason: Local investors purchased Shannon from the Stitchcraft Company (a sub­
sidiary of Winnebago) and moved it to Bancroft in 1969. The company 
failed to make a profit, and the assets were liquidated two years later. 
121. Midwest 
Speaker 
Company 
122. Farmer's 
Produce 
Company 
McGregor Local 40 1970 Speakers 
Reason; Midwest was located in McGregor about 15 years before it moved over 
200 miles away to Nebraska. The reason cited for the move was that Mid­
west wanted to expand but lacked the necessary capital, therefore, part 
ownership in the business was sold to an Omaha individual. The transfer 
to Nebraska was a prerequisite to acquiring the additional funds. 
Clarion Local — 30 1969 Chicken 
and egg 
processing 
Reason; Farmer's Produce was purchased by individuals from Minneapolis in about 
1967. The plant was operated at night and on weekends in order to avoid 
state and federal inspection. In 1969 the facility was destroyed by 
fire. The owners were suspected of arson. 
OJ 
00 
123. Page and Clarinda Branch Kansas City, 54 1973 Pre-fabri-
Hill Homes, plant Missouri cated 
Inc. (Merger-3) homes and 
components 
for apart­
ments 
Reason; The Clarinda plant was opened in 1955. In 1970 part interest in Page and 
Hill was sold to Engineering Components of Kansas City (suppliers of 
components foi: Kansas City apartment complexes). Engineering Components 
were forced out of business when some of the contractors they were sup­
plying declared bankruptcy and were unable to pay for components ordered. 
Table A-1 (Continued) 
Year 
Previous Ownership Estimated production 
Iowa charac- Headquarters peak ceased or Principal 
Company location teristics (if not local) employment transferred products 
124. Central Farm 
Products 
Allerton 
125. Frito-Lay 
Company 
Branch 
plant 
Trenton, 
Missouri 
50 1970 
Reason; Bankrup t. 
Otturawa 
Reason : 
Branch 
plant 
(Merger-2) 
Atlanta, 
Georgia 
65 1972 
Dried 
milk, 
butter and 
cheese 
Potato 
chips 
The Ottumwa plant was opened by the Red Dot Potato Chips Company in 1955. 
Later, in 1961, Red Dot was acquired by the Frito-Lay Company. In 1970 
a government anti-trust ruling forced Frito to dispose of nine of their 
plants. Subsequently, the Ottumwa facility was sold to the Nefco Com­
pany of Atlanta, Georgia. In 1972 Nefco was losing money, and they 
closed their Ottumwa plant in an effort to consolidate production and 
reduce costs. Later, the company declared bankruptcy. 
126. Jacob E. 
Decker and 
Sons 
Mason. City Branch 
plant 
Phoenix, 
Arizona 
1,300 1975 Môât 
products 
Reason; The liason City facility was purchased by tbe Armour Food Company In 1935 
and operated until August 15, 1975. The plant was closed because it was 
obsolete and Inefficient. Armour intends to open a new plant in Mason 
City in 1977, but it will have only about 400 employees. 
127. Fingerhut Mason City Branch Minnetonka, 120 1975 Offset 
Corporation plant Minnesota printing 
Reason: The Mason City plant mailed sales circulars for company products to 
potential mail order customers. When sales declined severely during 
the 1975 recession, several of Fingerhut's manufacturing and mailing 
plants were closed. The Mason City facility was about the last of 
the mailing branches organized and was the first one closed during the 
recession. 
128. Atlas Motor Mason City Branch White Plains, 165 1974 Motor 
Homes plant New York homes 
(Merger-2) 
Reason; AMF purchased Atlas in 1972 to give their Skaraper Division (which at 
that time was producing only camping trailers) a motor home capability. 
The Skamper plant in Higgins, Pennsylvania was at that time under­
utilized so production of the motor homes was transferred there. This 
move was further encouraged by the fact that Atlas was leasing what 
AMF considered a less than adequate facility. 
Table A-2. New lowa industry according to standard industrial classification and year of opening, 
1963-1975* 
Apparel and other 
finished products 
Food and kindred Textile mill made from fabric Lumber and wood 
products product» and similar materials products 
(SIC #20) (SIC #2:0 (SIC #23) (SIC #24) 
Ownership characteristics 
Year Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch 
1963 4 8 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1964 5 6 1 0 0 0 1 1 
1965 9 4 0 0 1 2 1 2 
1966 4 6 0 0 0 2 5 2 
1967 1 5 0 0 0 3 3 0 
1968 4 9 0 0 0 1 3 2 
1969 4 6 0 0 0 0 1 2 
1970 3 6 1 0 0 1 2 2 
1971 4 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1972 4 4 0 0 1 4 2 2 
1973 4 3 0 0 0 1 3 2 
1974 4 9 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1975 2 5 0 0 1 0 2 1 
^Source; calculated from [13-19] 
Table A-2 (Continued) 
Furniture and Paper and allied Print, pub., and Chemicals and 
fixtures products allied industries allied products 
(SIC #25) (SIC #26) (SIC #27) (SIC #28) 
Ownership characteristics 
Year Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch Local Brai 
1963 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 2 
1964 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 9 
1965 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 
1966 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
1967 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 5 
1968 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 
1969 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1970 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1971 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 
1972 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1973 3 0 1 0 0 1 2 3 
1974 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 
Table A-2 (Continued) 
Petroleum refin. 
and related ind. 
(SIC #29) 
Rubber and mise. 
plastic products 
(SIC #30) 
Leather and leather 
products 
(SIC #31) 
Stone, clay, glass 
and concrete prod. 
(SIC #32) 
O^mership characteristics 
Year Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch 
1963 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 
1964 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 1 
1965 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 
1966 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 
1967 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 
1968 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 
1969 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1 
1970 0 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 
1971 0 0 1 4 0 0 2 1 
1972 2 0 3 7 0 0 1 1 
1973 1 0 2 5 0 0 3 1 
1974 0 0 3 1 0 0 1 4 
1975 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 1 
Table A-2 (Continued) 
Electronical and 
Febrlcated metal electronic machin-
Primary metal prod., except Machinery, except ery, equipment and 
industries machinery and electrical supplies 
(SIC #33) (SIC #34) (SIC #35) (SIC #36) 
Ownership characteristics 
Year Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch 
1963 0 0 6 5 4 0 2 1 
1964 1 1 6 4 4 2 0 1 
1965 2 1 6 4 1 3 1 2 
1966 0 0 5 4 7 0 0 1 
1967 1 0 2 6 2 1 0 1 
1968 1 1 4 5 0 0 1 0 
1969 0 0 4 4 5 2 0 3 
1970 1 1 6 5 1 2 1 1 
1971 0 1 7 3 1 1 0 1 
1972 2 0 1 8 4 2 0 3 
1973 1 0 6 3 4 3 0 7 
1974 2 0 7 3 7 3 2 1 
1975 2 1 3 2 3 0 4 3 
Table A-2 (Continued) 
Measuring, analyzing 
Transportation and controlling Miscellaneous 
equipment instruments manufacturers 
(SIC #37) (SIC #38) (SIC #39) 
Ownership characteristics 
Year Local Branch Local Branch Local Branch 
1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1964 1 1 0 0 4 1 
1965 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1966 2 5 0 0 2 1 
1967 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1969 2 2 0 0 0 2 
1970 3 1 0 0 0 0 
1971 1 1 1 0 1 0 
1972 2 1 1 0 5 0 
1973 4 4 0 0 5 0 
1974 3 1 1 0 0 0 
1975 1 0 0 0 1 0 
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Table A-3. Examples of methods applied to estimate the various lags 
in real GNP and GSP 
Lag Example 
No lag in GNP 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Two quarter lag in GSP 
Percentage change in GNP from the fourth 
quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 
1971 versus the 1971 closings (openings) 
Percentage change in GNP from the second 
quarter of 1970 to the second quarter of 
1971 versus the 1971 closings (openings) 
Percentage change in GNP from the first 
quarter of 1970 to the first quarter of 
1971 versus the 1971 closings (openings) 
Percentage change in GNP from the fourth 
quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 
1971 versus the 1972 closings (openings) 
Two-thirds of the percentage change in 
GNP from the second quarter of 1970 to 
the fourth quarter of 1971 versus the 
1972 closings (openings) 
Percentage change in the average annual 
estimates in GSP from 1970 to 1971 versus 
1971 closings (openings) 
Six quarter lag in GSP Percentage change in the average annual 
estimates in GSP from 1970 to 1971 versus 
1972 closings (openings) 
Talbe A-4. Annual percentage change in GNP (GSP) lagged from zero to six quarters^ 
Lag 
Two Three Four Six Two Six 
Zero quarter quarter quarter quarter quarter quarter 
Year (GNP) (GNP) (GNP) (GNP) (GNP) (GSP) (GSP) 
1963 5.10 3.18 3.22 3.72 5.08 6.84 4.13 
1964 4.25 5.86 5.85 5.10 4.08 3.34 6.84 
1965 7.70 5.09 4.91 4.37 4.90 9.35 3.43 
1966 4.29 6.54 7.38 7.70 6.14 7.86 9.35 
1967 2.89 2.56 2.56 4.29 5.59 1.20 7.86 
1968 4.23 4.80 3.72 2.89 3.10 1.17 1.20 
1969 1.20 2.88 4.21 4.23 4.24 1.93 1.17 
1970 - .57 - .51 - .11 1.20 1.80 -3.37 1.93 
1971 4.58 2.72 2..02 - .57 - .51 3.17 -3.37 
1972 7.29 5.44 4.19 4.59 2.89 6.02 3.17 
1973 3.22 5.62 7.58 7.92 6.00 15.44 6.02 
1974 -4.35 - .91 .08 3.22 4.49 -7.22 15.44 
1975 2.45 -4.03 -5.71 -4.36 -2.27 b -7.22 
^Source: all data for percentage changes in GNP were calculated from information contained in the 
Survey of Current Business [47, 48]. GSP data were calculated from [2l]. 
^Not available in [21]. 
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Table A-5. Manufacturing industries classified according to durable 
or nondurable goods& 
SIC Durable goods SIC Nondurable goods 
24 Lumber products 20 Food and kindred products 
25 Furniture and fixtures 21 Tobacco manufacturers 
32 Stone, clay and glass 22 Textile mill products 
products 
33 23 Apparel and related 
33 Primary metal industries products 
34 Fabricated metal products 26 Paper and allied products 
35 Machinery (except elec.) 27 Printing and publishing 
36 Electrical machinery 28 Chemicals and allied 
products 
37 Transportation equipment 
29 Petroleum and coal 
38 Instruments products 
30 Rubber products 
31 Leather products 
^Source: [4, p. 156], 
Table A-6. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of branch and local plant 
openings per year on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to six quarters, 
1965-1975 
Y Coefficients Coefficient 
Intercept of X of 
Lag (Bq) (Bi) (62) R 
No lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
23.675 
23,770 
-.051 
-1.373 
.090 
,213 
,097 
,311 
.42 
1 .81  
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
22.468 
21.689 
1.037 
-.904 
003 
.263 
.420 
.164 
2.90 
.78 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
22.219 
21.636 
.987 
-.243 
** 
.014 
.138 
,540 
,144 
4.70 
.67 
** 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
21.134 
21.385 
1.067 
- . 108  
*** 
,032 
,129 
.649 
,137 
7.43 
.63 
*** 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
21.288 
21.378 
1.323 
-.173 
.022 
.171 
,403 
.084 
2.70 
.37 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
Table A-7. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of branch and local plant 
closings per year on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to six quarters, 
1965-1975 
Lag 
Y 
Intercept 
(Bo) 
Coefficient 
of X 
(Bp 
Coefficient 
of x^ 
(Bg) R2 F 
No lag in GNP 
Branch. 
Local 
8.507 
3.711 
-.542. 
-.355 
--003*** 
.111 
.261 
.498 
1.41* 
3.97 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
8.387 
4.434 
-.783* 
-.404 
.034 
.090 
.378 
.187 
2.43 
.92 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
7.867 
5.042 
-.597* 
-.203 
.030 
.017 
.302 
.086 
1.71 
.38 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch. 
Local 
8.235 
5.098 
-.534* 
-.103 
.029 
.002 
.254 
.021 
1.36 
.09 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
9.235 
5.480 
-.482 
. 107 
-.047 
-.058 
.255 
.054 
1.37 
.23 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
Table A-8. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of durable branch and 
local plant closings per year on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to six 
quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept of % of %% 
Lag (Bq) (pp (Bg) R 
No lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
5.277 
2.257 
,371 
,130 
-.013, 
.039 
.254 
.201 
1.36 
1 . 0 1  
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
5.243 
2.185 
.391 
.225 
,015 
.061 
.253 
.296 
1.35 
1 . 6 8  
Three quarter lag In GNP 
Branch 
Local 
4.776 
2.558 
,345 
115 
.005 
.019 
.193 
.109 
.96 
.49 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
5.102 
2.618 
.444 
,125 
.011 
,019 
.241 
.069 
1.27 
.30 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
5.670 
3.018 
.464 
,105 
.012 
,002 
.240 
.061 
1 .26  
. 2 6  
FC 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table A-9. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of eastern and western 
Iowa plant openings per year on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to six 
quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept of % of _ 
Lag (Bg) (Bp (Gg) R 
No lag in GNP 
West 
East 
19.426 
28.461 
-.922 
-.380 
,310 
,049 
.299 
.029 
1.71 
.12  
Two quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
15.707 
28.371 
.052 
. 281  
,392 
,050 
.455 
.014 
3.34 
.06 
Three quarter lag In GNP 
West 
East 
17.513 
26.790 
,791 
,238 
,144 
,039 
,357 2.22 
,064 .27 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
16.463 
26.416 
1.041 
.157 
.134 
,062 
.494 
,091 
3.91 
.40 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
16.356 
27.653 
1.289 
.320 
,120 
.025 
,346 
,011 
2 . 1 2  
.04 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Table A-10. Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of eastern and western 
Iowa plant closings per yeai on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to six 
quarters, 1965-1975 
Lag 
Y 
Intercept 
(Go) 
Coefficient 
of X 
(Gl) 
Coefficient 
of X^ 
(Gg) R2 F 
No lag in GOT 
West 
East 
5.475 
6.742 
.015* 
.092 
.165 
.279 
.79 
1.55 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
6.130 
6.601 
-.809*** 
-.379 
.031 
.093 
.531 
.138 
4.53** 
.64 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
5.949 
6.960 
-.631*** 
-.170 
.013 
.034 
.481 
.065 
3.32* 
.28 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
6.189 
7.144 
-.614* 
-.123 
.013 
.020 
.378 
.022 
2.43 
.09 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
West 
East 
7.052 
7.663 
-.476 
.100 
-.058 
-.046 
.375 
.023 
2.40 
.09 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** 
Significant at the 2.5 percent level. 
Table A-11, Coefficients resulting from regressing (quadratic) the number of western Iowa branch 
and local plant openings per year on the percentage change in GNP lagged from zero to 
six quarters, 1965-1975 
Y Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept of % of n 
Lag (Bg) (3p (Bg) R 
No lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
Two quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
Three quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
Four quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
Six quarter lag in GNP 
Branch 
Local 
6.780 
12.646 
5.391 
10.317 
6.994 
10.540 
6.374 
10.089 
6.205 
10.015 
-.113 
-.809 
.217 
-.165 
.552 
.239 
675 
,366 
.724 
.565 
.177, 
.133 
** 
.223 
.169 
.067 
.077 
.063 
.072 
.074 
.045 
** 
.380 
.245 
.552 
.210 
.357 
.230 
2.45 
1.30 
4.93 
.94 
2 . 2 2  
1.19 
** 
.469 3.53 
.332 1.99 
.335 
,219 
2.02 
1 . 1 2  
** 
Significant at the 10 percent level. 
Significant at the 5 percent level. 
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VIII. APPENDIX B: SPECIAL CASES 
156 
A. Test for Significance of Difference Between Two Proportions^ 
When dealing with data on a logically dichotoraous variable, the 
formula for the significance of the difference between two proportions 
is : 
Z= ICA 
/p(i -p) + pd-pf 
Ni - N, 
where 
Pj^ and Pg are the proportions for sample 1 and 2 respectively 
and are the number of cases in sample 1 and 2 respectively 
and 
Z is distributed normally. 
Note that the probability of finding a significant difference between 
two proportions is directly related to the magnitude of the difference 
and the number of observations (cases). For example; 
Z(y versus -^) = .373 
vers": 35%) = S'?: ' 
^Source; [6, p. 199]. 
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B. Rural Iowa Milk Producers 
1965-1975 was a decade of major transition for the Iowa dairy 
industry. During this period Iowa's creameries were converting to the 
production and marketing of whole milk instead of just cream. The 
whole milk processors were decisively more efficient, but scale econo­
mies could not be achieved unless the volume of production was in­
creased almost twenty fold. Milk drying equipment and the continuous 
chum were mostly responsible for the need of increased volume and 
larger capital investments. However, even if the creameries could 
afford to adopt the new technology, survival was not guaranteed. Sup­
plies of raw milk to, and sales fiom the creameries had to be suffi­
cient to support the larger operations. Distribution and sales econo­
mies in the form of milk bottling plants were required to achieve 
production economies, therefore, capital requirements for an efficient 
facility were further increased. 
In conclusion, the local independent creameries were forced to 
merge to insure that their supply and market areas would support a 
more efficient plant (a phenomena predicted by the merger theory of 
Chapter II). The two primary consolidation efforts occurred in 1964-
1965 and 1967-1970. Those companies not fortunate enough to join a 
cooperative or dairy association usually became distributors for one 
of their previous competitors or they were forced out of business. 
About fifteen independent rural Iowa creameries were closed during the 
period of study. 
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C. Rural Iowa Fertilizer Blending Plants 
From 1965 through 1968 six major chemical and oil companies 
established over 160 small fertilizer blending plants throughout rural 
Iowa (Table B-1). The reasons for such a large magnitude of inmigra-
tion were: (1) the profits of the small fertilizer blending plants 
had been good in the late 1950's and early I960's, (2) the chemical 
and oil companies had extra gas which could be converted to ammonia; 
and therefore, elected to vertically integrate down to the retail out­
lets, and (3) the bulk blending of dry fertilizer in small retail 
plants within ten to twenty miles of the fields became more profitable 
after an inexpensive method of providing diammonium phosphate was 
developed. 
The oil companies efforts to control part of the fertilizer 
market ended in failure. The new blending plants created a tremendous 
excess supply of fertilizer, and as a result, price cutting was preva­
lent and profits were not realized. The oil and chemical companies' 
failure to realize the anticipated profits encouraged them to with­
draw from retail sales. Almost all of the plants established by the 
oil companies were purchased (at less than cost) by the same local 
dealers and coops that the oil companies had hoped to eliminate. 
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Table B-1. Rural lowa fertilizer blending plants which initiated 
production from 1965-1968^ 
Number of 
Iowa 
Company branches 
American Cyanamid Company 18 
Armour Agriculture Company 5 
W. R. Grace - Davis Chemical Division 64 
Custom Farm Service 26 
Tennesse Corporation 8 
Kerr-McGee Oil 3 
Sinclair Petrochemicals 40 
^Source: [14, 15]. 
